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Contract Principles as a Guide for 
Protecting Intellectual Property Rights 
in Computer Software: The Limits of 
Copyright Protection, The Evolving 
Concept of Derivative Works, and the 
Proper Limits of Licensing 
Arrangements 
Thomas Lee Hazen* 
This Article explores the avenues for protecting computer software in-
tellectual property. The copyright laws provide a delicate balance between 
creators' rights to the fruits of their efforts and society's interest in ad-
vancing knowledge and encouraging the free flow of information. Tech-
nological advancements in the software industry have rendered copyright 
protection less than creators would desire. This Article examines the de-
marcation between protectable expression and the public domain of ideas, 
as well as the evolving concept of "derivative work." The Article also 
addresses the use of contractual provisions to fill the perceived gaps in 
the copyright laws. The Article concludes that while contractual provi-
sions can be helpful in determining the scope of a creator's proprietary 
interest in software, a "license" of computer software that is nothing 
more than a disguised sale should not be enforceable as a "back door" 
way of expanding the Copyright Act's protection. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past ten years, a rapidly expanding industry has developed 
in creating and distributing computer software. Formerly, computer 
• Professor of Law, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. B.A. t 969, J.D. 
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software sales and licenses were significant only within the context of 
commercial users. The recent advent of the personal computer has 
transformed consumer-oriented software into a major industry. The 
rapid emergence of new technology will significantly impact legal 
rights. Computer-related litigation has presented courts with new situa-
tions for which there are no direct precedents. The legislatures have 
also played an important role in forming the law governing the creation 
and distribution of computer software. 
Throughout this century, changing technology has broadly impacted 
the means of protecting intellectual property. For example, the inven-
tions of audio recordings,1 radio/ii television,3 and, more recently, video-
cassette recorders• have each strained traditional copyright law. This 
pressure has forced courts, and in some instances Congress, to make 
accommodations. Most currently, computer technology is seriously test-
ing the scope of copyright11 and patent6 law protection. 
1 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (1982) provides copyright protection for sound recordings 
fixed on or after February 15, 1972. The copyright laws do not protect sound record-
ings fixed prior to this date. Id. at § 301(c). See Lone Ranger Television, Inc. v. Pro-
gram Radio Corp., 740 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1984). At least one court has held that a 
computer chip containing computer instructions for producing sounds may be a sound 
recording subject to copyright protection. Innovative Concepts in Entertainment, Inc. v. 
Entertainment Enters. Ltd., 576 F. Supp. 457 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). 
9 Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Documentaries Unlimited, 42 Misc. 2d 723, 
248 N.Y.S.2d 809 (1964) (a common law copyright protects live radio performances); 
Waring v. WDAS Broadcasting Station, Inc., 327 Pa. 433, 194 A. 631 (1937) (suit in 
equity dealing with the right to prevent a sound recording from radio broadcast). 
8 W.G.N. Continental Broadcasting Co. v. United Video, Inc., 693 F.2d 622 (7th 
Cir. 1982) (holding news broadcast, along with accompanying teletext material, a sin-
gle copyrightable audiovisual work); Trophy Prods., Inc. v. Telebrity, Inc., 185 
U.S.P.Q. 830 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1975) (holding videotape eligible for copyright 
protection). 
4 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) (home 
video recording of a televised recording does not in itself lessen the commercial value 
and as such does not infringe upon the copyright). 
5 Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), 
cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). Even when dealing with the written word, 
courts have had difficulty identifying what portions of the copyrighted work are granted 
protection. E.g., Baker v. Seldin, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (identifying the portions of a 
copyrighted accounting system covered by the copyright monopoly); see also, e.g., Mor-
rissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) (sweepstakes system not 
copyrightable); Continental Casualty Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702, 704 (2d Cir. 
1958) (holding published forms describing plan for blanket bond to cover lost securities 
ineligible for copyright protection; format of forms may be copyrightable); Brown In-
strument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 910 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (following Taylor Instrument 
Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 785 
1986] Computer Software Protection 107 
At present, computer software mass distribution raises several legal 
problems related to protecting the ideas, processes, and designs con-
tained in the software. While patent laws play a role in protecting com-
puter hardware, they may not adequately protect software, even when 
the software is embedded in hardware through a silicon chip.7 Further 
problems include the time and expense in protecting patents and the 
(1944)), and holding that blank charts for mechanical recording of temperatures are not 
copyrightable); Crume v. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1944) 
(limiting the copyright protection accorded to a plan for revitalizing insolvent insurance 
companies through reorganization and changes in accounting methods); Taylor, 139 
F.2d at 98 (finding charts used for temperature recording machine not copyrightable); 
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. Supp. 517, 524 
(S.D.N.Y. i971) (holding answer sheets designed for computer scoring of certain stan-
dardized texts copyrightable). 
8 E.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (suggesting that patent Jaws as writ-
ten are ill equipped to deal with computer software technology). For discussion of the 
technology and terminology, see, e.g., Davidson, Protecting Computer Software: A 
Comprehensive Analysis, 23 JURIMETRICS J. 337 (1983); Keplinger, Computer 
Software - Its Nature and Protection, 30 EMORY L.J. 483 (1981); Note, Copyright 
Protection of Computer Program Object Code, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1723 (t 983). 
7 The Supreme Court in 1981 upheld the patentability of an industrial rubber mold-
ing process that was built around a mathematical algorithm embodied in a computer 
program. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981). In so holding, the Court pointed to 
previous decisions holding that although the algorithm itself is not patentable, the pres-
ence of an algorithm in an otherwise patentable process will not preclude patent law 
protection to the entire process viewed as a whole. Id. at 187-88; see, e.g., Parker v. 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978) (denying patent protection to an improved method of calcu-
lation, even when tied to a specific end use); Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972) 
(denying patent protection to a computer program because intellectual concepts are the 
basic tools of knowledge and thus will not be granted a protected monopoly). Accord In 
re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982) (denying patent protection); REPORT OF THE 
PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM TO PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF 
USEFUL ARTS 13 (1966) (declaring that patent laws are inappropriate for protecting 
software). See generally H. HANNEMAN, THE PATENTABILITY OF COMPUTER 
SOFTWARE (1985); Gemignani, Should Algorithms Be Patentable?, 22 JuRIMETRICS J. 
326 (1982); Milde, Life After Diamond v. Diehr, The CCPA Speaks Out on the Pat-
entability of Computer-Related Subject Matter, 64 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 434 (1982); 
Novick & Wallenstein, The Algorithm and Computer Software Patentability: A Scien-
tific View of a Legal Problem, 7 J. COMPUTERS, TECH. & LA w 313 ( 1980). But see In 
re Pardo, 684 F.2d. 912, 916-17 (C.C.P.A. 1982); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 
Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 1358, 1368-69 (D. 
Del. 1983) (holding computerized method for maintaining cash management account 
patentable) (appeal pending). See also, e.g., von Spakovsky, von Spakovsky, & Graffeo, 
The Limited Patenting of Computer Programs: A Proposed Statutory Approach, 16 
CuMB. L. REV. 27 (1985); cf. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 
F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) (granting copyright 
protection to proprietary operating system embodied in a computer chip). 
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public disclosure of the entire process required by patent protection 
law.8 
At least in theory, copyright laws offer significant protection for 
software. However, this protection is subject to the practical problems 
of piracy and policing the copyright.9 Furthermore, copyright laws of-
fer little, if any, protection to processes incorporated into the copy-
righted program, such as programming techniques.1° Copyright protec-
tion does not extend to ideas, but only to the · expression of ideas. 
Unfortunately, software's value frequently lies in the process rather 
than the particular format in which it is written. 
A somewhat related problem in copyright law protection for com-
puter software is defining a derivative work.11 While the concept of 
"derivative work" is problematic under copyright law generally, the 
question of what constitutes a derivative work within the context of 
computer software raises serious issues not yet addressed by legal schol-
ars. For example, the 1976 Federal Copyright Act prohibits both (1) 
unauthorized copying of copyrighted works, and (2) creating un-
authorized derivative works. 1ll This dual prohibition strongly suggests 
that something less than outright, direct copying can infringe upon a 
copyrighted work.18 Also, software licensing agreements frequently re-
strict creating "derivative works" without defining the term. 
The copyright laws' shortcomings have led software distributors to 
seek alternatives to the traditional sale of their products. Examples of 
alternative approaches include using contractual restraints in licensing 
agreements, .. and applying trade secret law.16 Courts have not yet seri-
8 However, registering a copyright is relatively easy and inexpensive. Fees for ob-
taining the maximum 17-year patent protection (35 U.S.C. § 41 (1982)) are generally 
at least S3200. In addition, attorney fees for legal services are invariably necessary for a 
successful patent application. See 1 D. BENDER, COMPUTER LAW § 3A.02 (1984); 
Note, Defining the Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Software, 38 STAN. L. 
REV. 497, 504 (1986) [hereafter Note, Copyright Protection]. 
9 See, e.g., Conley & Bryan, A Unifying Theory for the Litigation of Computer 
Software Copyright Cases, 63 N.C.L. REV. 563 (1985); see also supra note 5. 
10 E.g., Brooks, Copyright and the Uses of Educational Software, 20 Enuc. BULL. 6 
(1985). But cf, e.g., Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 609 F. 
Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa.), amend. denied, 609 F. Supp. 1325 (E.D. Pa. 1985), afj'd, 797 
F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986); SAS Inst., Inc. v. S&H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 
816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985). 
11 17 u.s.c. § 101 (1982). 
11 Id. at § 106. 
18 See infra text accompanying notes 45-55. 
14 See Adam, Gordon & Starr, Contractual, Financial, and Tax Issues in Major 
Procurements, 4 COMPUTER L.J. 465 (1984); Hansen, Software Distribution, 
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ously questioned these innovative distribution methods, primarily be-
cause the developments are relatively new and rapidly evolving. Some 
legislation and many scholars have suggested statutory changes to han-
dle the problems presented by new technology. 18 However, the issue of 
generating maximum protection under the current state of the law 
through contractual arrangements needs more attention. This Article 
will explore the relevant issues and alternatives. 
This Article's primary focus is not direct piracy through physical 
copying, but rather the subtler and more difficult question of how 
much the user may modify or borrow from software without violating 
the creator's rights. 17 Part I examines the types of protection for 
software available under laws relating to intellectual property. After 
defining the nature and scope of the problem, Part I explores issues 
surrounding the use of various laws to restrict infringement on software 
creators' rights. These laws include copyright law, patent law, trade 
secret law, and the common law tort of misappropriation. Part II sys-
tematically surveys the contractual approaches to software protection. 
Such a survey necessarily involves discussing the limitations of shrink 
wrap licenses, including whether public policy issues could void such 
agreements even if they complied with the traditional rules of contract 
formation. Part II also discusses whether federal copyright law might 
preempt overly restrictive limited use licenses. 18 
The Article concludes that adequate software protection requires 
contractual supplements to intellectual property laws. At the same time, 
Remarketing, and Publishing Agreements, 4 COMPUTER L.J. 625 (1984); Harris, 
Complex Contract Issues in the Acquisition of Hardware and Software, 4 COMPUTER 
L.J. 77 (t 983). 
18 Contractual approaches to protecting intellectual property necessarily involve con-
sidering trade secret law. This discussion is brief since both the courts and scholarly 
journals have addressed this area of the law. 
18 E.g., von Spakovsky, von Spakovsky, & Graffeo, supra note 7, at 27. 
17 The Act provides: 
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this section 
may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy from 
which such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or other 
transfer of all rights in the program. Adaptations so prepared may be 
transferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner. 
17 U.S.C. § 117 (1982). See infra note 23 and accompanying text; see also Stern, 
Section 117 of the Copyright Act: Charter of Software Users' Rights Or an Illusory 
Promise1, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 459 (1985). 
18 See, e.g., Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs., 564 F. Supp. 1471 (D. Nev. 1983); see 
Luccarelli, The Supremacy of Federal Copyright Law Over State Trade Secret Law for 
Copyrightable Computer Programs Marked With a Copyright Notice, 3 COMPUTER 
L.J. 19 (1981). 
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courts must preserve the delicate balance between the developer's right 
to profit from her creativity and the need to advance knowledge. Ac-
cordingly, courts should not enforce overly restrictive contractual limi-
tations on using and disseminating computer software. Finally, the Ar-
ticle argues that courts should utilize a de facto sale doctrine to deal 
with software licenses that are disguised as sales to limit the rights that 
would ordinarily exist under copyright law. 
I. PROTECTING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN COMPUTER 
SOFTWARE 
This Part begins by attempting to define the unique problems in 
protecting software as intellectual property. The Part then analyzes the 
three legal protections most commonly employed by software creators: 
copyright law, trade secret law, and the tort cause of action for 
misappropriation. 
A. The Problem Defined 
Computer programs are basically a series of commands instructing 
the machine (or "hardware") what functions to perform.19 Computer 
software programs are generally written in "source code," using a pro-
gramming language such as BASIC or PASCAL. A programming lan-
guage is a predefined set of instructions used by the programmer to tell 
the computer what to do. The computer then translates the source code 
into "object code," or machine language, which the computer can read 
but is far less intelligible to human programmers. Source code is gener-
ally stored on cassette tape, floppy disk, hard disk, or some other ma-
chine-readable medium. Frequently, the less intelligible object code is 
stored on cassette or disk; it may also be stored on a silicon chip known 
as a ROM (read only memory) chip. 
There are various ways of reproducing or copying a computer pro-
gram. In many instances, reproducing the electronic representation of 
the source or object code on a diskette through direct copying is possi-
ble. This direct copying is similar to copying sounds from a phono-
graph record onto an audio cassette. One can also trans£ er the program 
from one machine to another by using data communication techniques 
through a cable connection or telecommunications. Alternatively, some-
one with a printed source code listing can enter the code into any com-
patible computer. 
19 For a more detailed description of the computing process, see 1 D. BENDER, 
supra note 8, at ch. 2; L. DICKEY, INTRODUCTION TO COMPUTER CONCEPTS (1974). 
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Software creators can inhibit direct copying in several ways. Scram-
bling the order in which the electronic data is stored may protect dis-
kettes. However, each new copy protection scheme becomes a challenge 
to "hackers" who usually find a way to break down the protection. A 
second method of protection is encrypting the code so that the machine 
can decipher and interpret it, but a human generally cannot.20 Despite 
these and other techniques, widespread piracy of computer programs 
continues. Physical copy protection schemes have slowed the process, 
but have not eliminated the problem. 
The devices and programs developed to break through copy protec-
tion techniques make stealing software relatively easy. Popular comput-
ing magazines are replete with debates on the ethics of copying.21 
Software pirates attempt to justify copying by pointing to the high 
prices charged for programs contained on disks costing less than $2.00. 
Software developers counter that the high price is justified by high 
start-up and development costs and by the relatively short commercial 
life of most programs. 
This Article does not address the debate between software developers 
and pirates. H Copyright laws clearly prohibit unauthorized direct cop-
ying except for the limited purpose of making archival copies by some-
one who has rightfully purchased the program. The Copyright Act also 
permits rightful owners of a copyrighted work to make copies to facili-
tate their personal use of the software. 23 
10 This is generally a very inefficient and time consuming process, much like trying 
to decipher a military intelligence secret code. 
11 E.g., Holmes, Was Robin a Hood1, 35 J. Svs. MGMT. 6 (1984); Jones, You'll 
Find Nothing Merry About EDP Robin Hoods, NATIONAL UNDERWRITER 88:3 (Nov. 
16; 1984); Pender, Perspectives on Computer Ethics and Crime, 36 Bus. 30 (1986). 
19 The argument that software's high cost justifies piracy, while perhaps evoking 
some of Robin Hood's romance, has no legal basis and would be no defense to a copy-
right infringement action. In fact, such a willful disregard of the copyright laws might 
lead a court to award statutory damages up to SS0,000. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (1982). 
18 Id. at§ 117. All such archival copies must be destroyed if continued possession of 
the computer program is no longer rightful. Id. The federal copyright statute provides: 
[I]t is not an infringement for the owner of a copy of a computer program 
Id. 
to make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that 
computer program provided: (1) that such a new copy or adaptation is 
created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program in 
conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other manner, or (2) 
that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only .... 
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1. The First Sale Doctrine 
The rightful owner of a copy of a copyrighted work has the right to 
sell that copy, but nothing more. This right is known as the first sale 
doctrine. Under this doctrine, "the owner of a particular copy ... or 
any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority 
of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of 
that copy .... "24 This limitation on the copyright owner's ability to 
restrict resale inhibits effective policing of downstream piracy. 
Some software distributors rely on licensing arrangements rather 
than outright sale. By licensing the use of software rather than selling a 
copy in the same manner that one sells a book, distributors can avoid 
the first sale doctrine's consequences.211 
Licensing entails both commercial licenses28 and end user, mass mar-
keted licenses, such as "shrink wrap" or "box top" licenses, under 
which the supplier purports to bind the purchaser merely by the pur-
chaser's act of opening the package.27 Since the licensor drafts most 
licensing agreements, they are one-sided and of questionable enforce-
ability, especially in the mass marketing context. 
B. Copyright Protection and the Elusive Concept of a Derivative 
Work 
1. Scope of the Copyright Monopoly 
Copyright laws, originally designed to protect the written word, have 
expanded to several expressive mediums. They now protect art, music, 
phonograph recordings, the performance of copyrighted works, movies, 
14 Id. at § 109(a). 
1a See, e.g., 1, 2, 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT§§ 4, 5, 8.11, 10.0l(A) 
(1985); Einhorn, The Enforceability of "Tear-Me-Open" Software License Agreements, 
67 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 509, 520 (1985) (suggesting that the first sale doctrine may 
render invalid certain shrink wrap license terms). 
te Hansen, supra note 14, at 655; Hoffman, Software Development and Service 
Agreements, 24 JURIMETRICS J. 58 (1983). 
17 E.g., Brooks, Shrink-Wrapped License Agreements: Do They Prevent the Exis-
tence of a "First Sale"?, 1 COMPUTER LAW. 17 (April, 1984); Gilburne, Enforceabil-
ity of Shrink-Wrapped Software Licenses in PLI, COMPUTER LAW INST. 447 (1984); 
Sherman, Shrink-Wrap Licensing of Computer Programs in PLI, COMPUTER LAW 
INST. 541 (1985); Note, Commercial Law - The Enforceability of Computer "Box 
Top" License Agreements Under the U.C.C., 7 WHITTIER L. REV. 881 (1985) [hereaf-
ter Note, "Box Top" License Agreements]. Of particular importance in this regard is 
the law relating to the unenforceability of unconscionable contracts. See, e.g., Note, 
Frankly Incredible: Unconscionability in Computer Contracts, 4 COMPUTER L.J. 695 
(t 984). 
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and television. 28 Copyright laws also protect computer software's source 
codes and object codes.29 The software's screen images are also copy-
rightable as an audiovisual work. Copyright owners possess exclusive 
control over the distribution of their copyrighted work.30 However, the 
scope of the protection is significantly limited; the copyright monopoly 
extends to the expression of ideas rather than the ideas themselves. 31 
This limitation strikes a fair balance between the creators' right to the 
fruits of their labors and society's interest in sharing knowledge and 
technological advancements. 
The problem of identifying what is protectable expression and what 
is in the public domain of ideas has plagued the courts and commenta-
tors since the inception of copyright laws.32 A simple example illus-
18 See supra text accompanying notes 1-4; infra text accompanying notes 34-37. 
19 E.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1249 
(3d. Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). The Semiconductor Chip Pro-
tection Act of 1984 supplements copyright law protection. The Act grants special pro-
tection to the "mask" when a program is embedded in a ROM (Read Only Memory) 
silicon chip. 17 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq. (t 984 Supp.). The Chip Act protection supple-
ments the copyright laws but its reach is not as comprehensive. For example, Chip Act 
protection lasts for only ten years and thus is shorter than the patent laws ( 1 7 years 
plus renewal) and the copyright laws (the author's life plus 50 years). Also, under the 
Chip Act reproduction of the semiconductor mask by way of reverse engineering is 
permissible. In this regard, the Act's protection more closely resembles trade secret law 
rather than patent or copyright protection which prohibits copying. For a detailed anal-
ysis of the Chip Act, see Symposium: The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 
and its Lessons, 70 MINN. L. REV. 263 (1985). 
so 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1982); see infra note 46. 
81 Ideas are in the public domain unless they are sufficiently novel and useful to 
qualify for patent protection or, alternatively, unless they are confidential and thus 
qualify for trade secret protection. See generally NATIONAL CoMM'N ON NEW TECH-
NOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT (1978). But cf. Williams 
v. Arndt, 227 U.S.P.Q. 615 (D. Mass. 1985) (holding that computer program "copied" 
from plaintiffs copyrighted booklet explaining commodities trading system infringed 
the copyright; the court viewed the program as a copy of the expression rather than a 
restatement of the ideas). For literature discussing the patent laws, see supra notes 6-7. 
For discussion of trade secret law, see infra text accompanying notes 95-132. 
81 E.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879) (limiting portions of copyrighted ac-
counting system covered by copyright monopoly); see also, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. 
Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 434 (4th Cir. 1986); Morrissey v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 379 
F.2d 675 (1st Cir. 1967) (sweepstakes system not copyrightable); Continental Casualty 
Co. v. Beardsley, 253 F.2d 702, 704 (2d Cir. 1958) (holding that published forms 
describing plan for blanket bond to cover lost securities are eligible for copyright pro-
tection but that infringement not shown); Brown Instrument Co. v. Warner, 161 F.2d 
910 (D.C. Cir. 1947) (following Taylor Instrument Cos. v. Fawley-Brost Co., 139 
F.2d 98 (7th Cir. 1943) (holding that blank charts for mechanical recording of temper-
atures not copyrightable), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 785 (1944); Crume v. Pacific Mut. 
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trates the dilemma.88 Assume that the play Romeo and Juliet was val-
idly copyrighted. Is another play about two young lovers from feuding 
families simply borrowing the idea, or is it using a similar expression? 
Assume further that the second play's setting is New York City, and 
the famous balcony scene is transposed to a back alley and a fire es-
cape. Is this merely borrowing the idea, or is it a taking of the idea's 
. expression? 
The foregoing questions are also relevant in determining what con-
stitutes a "derivative work."8" Copyright protection for computer pro-
grams is somewhat expanded in that under appropriate circumstances 
the screen images may be protectable as an audiovisual work.8& For-
malistically, one could view copyright protection for software as distinct 
from any protection granted to the source or object codes. Under such a 
view, copyright for the screen image does not flow automatically from 
copyright protection for the source code.86 On the other hand, while 
Life Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1944) (limiting copyright protection for plan 
revitalizing insolvent insurance companies through reorganization and changes in ac-
counting methods); Taylor, 161 F.2d at 910 (charts for temperature recording machine 
not copyrightable); Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. v. Graphic Controls Corp., 329 F. 
Supp. 517, 524 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (holding answer sheets designed for computer scoring 
of certain standardized texts are copyrightable). 
33 This example is borrowed from Professor John Conley's presentation to the 
North Carolina Bar Association in Winston-Salem, N .C., on Feb. 25, 1986. See also, 
e.g., Durham Indus., Inc. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980); E.F. 
Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 1986 Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) § 25,887 at 20,054-055 
(D. Minn. 1985) ("to the extent that an author's work is derived from preexisting 
materials in the public domain, copyright protection is afforded only to the non-trivial, 
original features contributed by the author to the derivative work"). 
s• See infra text accompanying notes 47-53. 
36 E.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986); see infra 
notes 69, 77-81. 
38 See Note, Copyright Protection, supra note 8, at 531. But see Comment, Proving 
Copyright Infringement of Computer Software: An Analytical Framework, 18 Lov. 
L.A.L. REV. 919, 942, 945 (1985). Thus, for example, someone seeking to protect both 
the code and screen images should comply with copyright notice requirements both 
with respect to the viewer of the screen and the beginning of the code. The writer 
suggests applying the "unit publication doctrine" to software protection so as to protect 
both the code and screen image by a single copyright. Note, Copyright Protection, 
supra note 8, at 530-34; see, e.g., Koontz v. Jaffarian, 787 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(holding under unit publication doctrine that computer program copyright protected 
data compilation that was part of the program and manuals). For other cases recogniz-
ing the unit publication doctrine, but not involving computer software, see, e.g., Mono-
gram Models, Inc. v. Industro Motive Corp., 492 F.2d 1281 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 
419 U.S. 843 (1974) (holding scale model airplane kits copyrightable); Uneeda Doll 
Co. v. Goldfarb Novelty Co., 373 F.2d 851 (2d Cir. 1967) (Pee Wee doll copyrightable 
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prudence would call for copyrighting the code and screen images sepa-
rately, copyrighted code should, through the concept of derivative work, 
protect against copying or substantial "borrowing" from a protectable, 
nonfunctional screen image produced by the code. 37 
The Copyright Act greatly simplified the formalities for securing 
copyright protection. Formerly, copyright protection began on publica-
tion. This led to difficult questions regarding exactly when the work 
was first published.38 Under the Copyright Act, copyright in a work 
created after 1978 begins with its creation.39 The procedural require-
ments for obtaining copyright protection are minimal and inexpensive. 
The Act preconditions protection simply on placing a copyright notice 
at the beginning of the work. Inadvertently failing to give the required 
copyright notice does not necessarily preclude copyright protection:'0 
In addition to the notice requirement, the Act strongly encourages 
federal registration of all copyrights.41 The registration procedures en-
tail at least a limited disclosure of the copyrighted material. Unfortu-
nately, this disclosure may conflict with supplemental protection in-
tended by trade secret laws.42 Also, any copyright infringement action 
generally results in complete disclosure of the copyrighted material. As-
suming the formal requirements are satisfied, the copyright protection 
as a work of art); Lydiard-Peterson Co. v. Woodman, 204 F. 921 (8th Cir. 1913) 
(holding map copyrightable); 2 M. NIMMER, supra note 25, at § 7. l0[D]. 
87See Whelan Assocs., Inc. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 
1322 (E.D. Pa. 1985), afj'd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986). 
88 E.g., Letter Edged in Black Press, Inc. v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 320 F. Supp. 
1303 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Kaplan, Publication in Copyright Law: The Question of Phono-
graph Records, 103 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (1955); Selvin, Should Performance Dedi-
cate?, 42 CALIF. L. REV. 40 (1954). 
89 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1982). 
40 Id. at §§ 401, 402. Inadvertent failure to affix a proper notice upon publication 
will not forfeit the copyright protection. See, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 
783 F.2d 421, 443-44 (4th Cir. 1986); H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 
53, 143 (1976). 
41 17 U.S.C. § 407(a) (1982) requires registration by depositing two copies of the 
work with the copyright office within three months of the work's publication. Failure 
to register does not have significant immediate impact and is not a precondition to 
copyright protection (id. at § 408(a)), but registration is strongly encouraged. For ex-
ample, registration within five years of publication is prima facie evidence of the copy-
right's validity. Id. at § 410(c). Furthermore, the Act limits the remedies for infringe-
ment that are available absent registration. Id. at § 412. 
42 To satisfy the registration requirement for computer programs, the first 25 and 
last 25 pages of source code must be filed with the Copyright Office. 37 C.F.R. § 
202.20(c)(2)(vii) (1986). 
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lasts for fifty years beyond the author's death.48 In the case of anony-
mous and pseudonymous works and works made for hire, the copyright 
term is the shorter of seventy-five years from publication or one hun-
dred years from creation. 44 
2. Defining Copyright Infringement and Derivative Works 
Having considered the types of works that can qualify for copyright 
protection and the procedures for securing the protection, the following 
analysis discusses the scope of copyright protection. Formerly, copyright 
law granted a copyright owner the exclusive right to produce and 
reproduce the copyrighted work. The Copyright Act expanded the 
scope of protection beyond the copying of works and established an ex-
clusive right to create "derivative works."411 A derivative work includes 
works "based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a transla-
tion, musical arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion pic-
ture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridgment, condensa-
tion, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or 
adapted."48 The Act further provides: "A work consisting of editorial 
revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a 
whole, represent an original work of authorship, is a 'derivative 
work.' " 47 This broad definition precludes a bright-line test, and makes 
48 Trade secret protection is discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 95-132. 
Similarly, the patent laws require disclosure as a condition of patent protection. 
44 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (t 982). Under the former law, the initial copyright lasted for 
28 years and was subject to renewal for another 28 years. See, e.g., Fred Fisher Music 
Co. v. M. Witmark & Sons, 318 U.S. 643,644 (1943). The 1976 Act has very complex 
rules for the duration of copyrights created prior to 1978. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 304, 305 
(1982). Briefly, a work in its initial 28 year term may be renewed for another 47 years 
(i.e., a total of 75 years). Id. at § 304(a). For copyrights renewed prior to the new law, 
the renewal term was extended so as to provide a total of 75 years. Id. at § 304(b). 
45 17 u.s.c. § 103 (1982). 
48 Id. at § 101. Subject to "fair use" limitations (id. at § 107), a copyright owner 
"has the exclusive rights to do and authorize any of the following: 
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
(2) to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work; . " 
Id. at § 106. The section also grants the exclusive right to distribute, to transfer owner-
ship, and to rent, lease or lend (id. at § 106(3)), and to publicly perform or display the 
work (id. at § 106(4),(5)). The Act provides that anyone who violates any of the copy-
right owner's exclusive rights enumerated above is an infringer of the copyright. Id. at 
§ 501. 
47 Id. at § 101. Many of the issues surrounding the derivative work concept have 
long been a part of the copyright laws, but the first reported case using the term was 
Norn Music, Inc. v. Kaslin, 343 F.2d 198,200 (2d Cir. 1965). See Brown, The Widen-
ing Gyre: Are Derivative Works Getting Out of Hand?, 3 CARDOZO ART & ENT. L.J. 
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each determination of what is a derivative work highly factual. In the 
computer software context, defining "derivative work" presents particu-
larly difficult problems.48 
Tracing the 197 6 Copyright Act's historical development sheds light 
on its derivative work concept. The derivative work concept was signifi-
cant even prior to the 1976 Act,49 which retains the principles of the 
former Act. For example, in determining whether a work based on an 
uncopyrighted work itself merits copyright protection, identifying the 
portion of the derivative work deserving protection is an important 
function. 60 Also, a number of cases raise the issue of derivative work 
protection when the underlying work is dedicated to the public domain. 
This can happen, for example, when the copyright holder fails to re-
new the copyright (in order to secure the maximum permissible dura-
tion, the former copyright statute required renewal; it is no longer a 
factor under the Copyright Act).61 Although the cases conflict, the bet-
ter view is that the loss of the copyright in the underlying work, such as 
a book, does not destroy all copyright protection for the derivative 
1, 13 n.69 (1984 ). For a chart depicting the increasing number of cases involving the 
concept of a derivative work, see id. at 25. 
48 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1982); see infra text accompanying notes 83-88. 
49 See generally Goldstein, Derivative Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 
30 J. COPYRIGHT Soc. 209 (1982); see also, e.g., Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 
300, 302 (7th Cir. 1983) (to claim a copyrightable derivative work, party must show: 
(1) that the copyright owner authorized derivative work and (2) the new work adds 
original creative or artistic contributions); Gallery House, Inc. v. Yi, 582 F. Supp. 
1294, 1297 (N.D. III. 1984) (same). 
50 See generally Denicola, Copyright in Collections of Facts: A Theory for the Pro-
tection of Nonfiction Literary Works, 81 CoLUM. L. REV. 516 (1981) (discussing the 
difficulty of identifying that portion of nonfiction in the public domain and the portion 
that is copyrighted). The issue frequently arises in the context of anthologies and com-
pilations of material that is in the public domain. See, e.g., Koontz v. Jaffarian, 787 
F.2d 906 ( 4th Cir. 1986) (compilation of facts relating to electrical estimating system); 
Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 751 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 
1984) (compilation of facts relating to publicly traded bonds); Wainright Sec., Inc. v. 
Wall Street Transcript Corp., 558 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1014 
(1978) (failure to show fair use of· copyrighted material warranted injunction); 
Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 366 F.2d 303 (2d Cir. 1966) (historical 
facts in copyrighted work not protected), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967); Rand 
McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Sys., Inc., 634 F. Supp. 604 (N.D. Ill. 1986) 
(direct copying of mileage data compilation from map to computer disk was copyright 
infringement); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. National Indep. Directory Serv., Inc., 371 
F. Supp. 900 (W.D. Ark. 1974) (copyright precludes direct reproduction of compilation 
but not copying and reformatting the material contained therein). 
61 See, e.g., Ricordi & Co. v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 189 F.2d 469 (2d Cir. 1951) 
(addressing the issue but not using the term "derivative work"). 
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work, such as a movie.112 
Even without the renewal procedure, the Copyright Act does not set-
tle these and other issues relating to derivative works. The Act does 
expand the concept of derivative work. For example, the new law in-
cludes creating derivative works as one of the copyright owner's exclu-
sive rights. 118 Thus, an unauthorized derivative of a copyrighted work 
infringes on the copyright. In including a derivative work as an infring-
ing act, it is unclear whether the new law is simply refining and clari-
fying the types of activities that constitute an infringement, or whether 
it is setting up an infringing derivative work as something distinct from 
an infringing reproduction. 11• 
The addition of this concept in 197 6 supports the view that the 
Copyright Act provides wider protection than did the former law, 
which simply prohibited infringement by copying. One case suggests 
that some element of copying must exist to find an infringing derivative 
work. Accordingly, the mere borrowing of an idea is not an infringing 
derivative work. 1111 On the other hand, something less than direct copy-
ing that constitutes a borrowing of protected expressions clearly is an 
infringement. Thus, in the context of computer software, the creation of 
an infringing derivative work can arise out of "borrowing" from the 
copyrighted source code or object code, "borrowing" from screen images 
protected as audiovisual works, and "borrowing" of distinctive copy-
righted characters. 
Determining what constitutes copyright infringement by way of cop-
ying is often difficult. For example, when someone copyrights a paint-
ing, can someone else photograph the painting? Although the answer 
might have been unclear under former law, the Copyright Act prohibits 
copying regardless of the medium and regardless of whether the copy-
52 Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 668 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1981); Russell v. 
Price, 612 F.2d 1123 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 952 (1980); Grove Press, 
Inc. v. Greenleaf Publishing Co., 247 F. Supp. 518 (E.D.N.Y. 1965). 
58 See supra note 46. 
114 Conley & Bryan, supra note 9, at 573. 
55 As one court has observed, "The little available authority suggests that a work is 
not derivative unless it has been substantially copied from the prior work." Litchfield v. 
Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352, 1357 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that E.T. was not an infringe-
ment of plaintifPs musical play Lokey from Maldemar, which was based on two aliens 
who were temporarily stranded near the North Pole, and were befriended by a scien-
tist's two young children). The court's statement goes too far in limiting the scope of 
what constitutes an infringing derivative work. See Note, Copyright Protection, supra 
note 8, at 510-11; infra text accompanying notes 73, 85-90; see also Zambito v. Para-
mount Pictures Corp., 613 F. Supp. 1107 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding Raiders of the 
Lost Ark not an infringement of Black Rainbow, which had a similar theme). 
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ing is from one medium to another. 56 In the context of a computer 
program, the issue arises whether a copyrighted program contained on 
a disk or ROM chip loses its protection because it is not perceptible 
once loaded into the machine and translated into machine readable 
form. Courts initially viewed this as a thorny issue, but apparently they 
have finally recognized copyright protection.57 
Directly copying copyrighted source or object codes unquestionably 
constitutes an infringement. A more difficult question is how much 
"borrowing" short of literal, direct copying is permissible. This ques-
tion involves not only determining the degree of original effort put into 
the new work, but also identifying what portions of the copyrighted 
work are protected against misappropriation by others. For example, a 
court recently held that a public domain computer database of judicial 
decisions cannot include the pagination as it would appear in the West 
Publication Company reporters without infringing on West's copy-
right.58 The court reasoned that although referring to the West citation 
was permissible, including the West pagination on a page-by-page ba-
sis would seriously cut into the economic value of West's copyrighted 
expression.59 The court thus viewed appropriating West's paging for-
68 For example, it is infringement to take a copyrighted source code from a maga-
zine, enter it into a computer and then sell copies. Micro-Spare, Inc. v. Amtype Corp., 
592 F. Supp. 33 (D. Mass. 1984 ); see also, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Phillips 
Consumer Elec. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 618 n.12 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 
(1982); Rand NcNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Sys., 634 F. Supp. 604 (N.D. Ill. 
1986), 600 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. III. 1984) (same case); Midway Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-
America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 139 (D.N.J. 1982). 
67 E.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 
1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984); see also, e.g., Note, Copyright Law and 
Computer Software: The Third and Ninth Circuits take Another Bite of the Apple, 49 
ALB. L. REV. 170 (1984); Note, Computer Copyright Law: An Emerging Form of 
Protection for Object Code Software After Apple v. Franklin, 5 COMPUTER L.J. 233 
(1984); Note, Roms, Rams, and Copyright: The Copyrightability of Computer Chips, 
14 Sw. U.L. REV. 685 (1984). 
68 West Publishing Co. v. Mead Data Cent., Inc., 799 F.2d 1219 (8th Cir. 1986), 
affg 616 F. Supp. 1571 (D. Minn. 1985) (preliminary injunction granted). The court 
noted that West is not the official reporter for any court. 
69 The court held that using the citation was fair, but using page-by-page numbers 
was not. As the court explained: 
There is an additional contribution by West Publishing which goes be-
yond the simple copyright which exists for their editorial work. The ge-
nius of the work is that it is self-indexing. By assembling the cases as they 
have been arranged in sequenced volumes, a case can be indexed by its 
name with a volume number, series designation, and page number .... 
The West Publishing Company's arrangement is a significant work of 
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mat as equivalent to directly copying its copyrighted material. 
A somewhat related question is whether translating a computer pro-
gram to a different machine or a different code is an infringing work. 
The technology and differences between programming languages make 
this question more difficult than the claim that the copyrighted source 
code loses any basis for protection when translated and read into the 
machine. An early federal case (that has since been overruled) held that 
a French translation of Uncle Tom's Cabin did not infringe on the 
copyrighted original.60 Today courts consider directly translating either 
a literary work or computer source code a direct copying copyright in-
fringement. In one case61 involving translating computer software, the 
court drew an analogy to literary translations. It held that translating a 
program from one source code to another to enable the program origi-
nally written for a large computer to run on a microcomputer was a 
direct copying copyright infringement. 
In contrast, another court held that when direct translation is impos-
sible there is no copyright infringement. Thus, a programmer did not 
infringe the copyright to a source code in BASIC written for an Atari 
microcomputer when he wrote a program substantially similar in func-
tion and screen design in PASCAL for the IBM-PC.62 As for the 
screen design, the court held that although screens may be copyright-
able as an audiovisual work, the idea was not copyrightable since the 
layout was purely functional. Thus, there was nothing protectable m 
the expression on the screen.63 
skill and enterprise which is itself entitled to copyright protection. 17 
U.S.C. § 103 .... LEXIS has long noted at the beginning of each of its 
cases the "cite" according to the West Publishing Company arrangement. 
This West acknowledges is a fair use of its copyrighted material ... That 
cite calls a researcher to West's books - which they are in business to sell 
as well as create . . . . 
With immediate access to the jump cite, there is instant access to West's 
whole arrangement; you never again need to get each and every aspect of 
West's copyrighted arrangement of cases. This is the instance when ... 
'a use that supplants any part of the normal market for a copyrighted 
work would ordinarily be considered an infringement.' Senate Report [No. 
94-473)," cited in Harper & Row Publishers v. Nation Enters., __ U.S. 
--, 105 S. Ct. 2218, 2235, 85 L.Ed.2d 588 (1985). 
West, 616 F. Supp. at 1578-79. 
80 Stowe v. Thomas, 23 Fed. Cas. 201 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853) (No. 13,514). 
81 Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986), 
affg, 609 F. Supp. 1307 (E.D. Pa. 1985) 
81 Q-Co Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). 
83 Id. at 615; see supra text accompanying notes 35-36; infra text accompanying 
notes 77-78. 
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An extension of the translation issue arose when the copyright owner 
of a commodities trading program published in booklet form claimed 
infringement by the author of a computer program incorporating plain-
tiffs trading system.6" The court found that since the defendant in es-
sence translated the system into a different language (i.e. computer 
code), the defendant had infringed the plaintiffs copyright. Whether 
the computer program was really a duplication of the copyright owner's 
expression, or the appropriation of his ideas into a different form of 
expression, is a close question. The ruling giving copyright protection 
to the trading system's creator reflects a very broad view of the copy-
right monopoly scope.611 
As a general proposition, the copyright owner has the burden of 
proving infringement.66 However, to prove infringement by copying, 
the owner need not necessarily present direct evidence of copying. Cir-
cumstantial evidence suffices.67 Access to the copyrighted source code is 
strong circumstantial evidence, especially when direct copying was pos-
sible and the allegedly infringing work is substantially similar both in 
code and in appearance to the copyrighted work.68 The issue is whether 
84 Williams v. Arndt, 227 U.S.P.Q. 615 (D. Mass. 1985). 
85 The Williams decision was criticized in Reback & Hayes, Copyright Gone Astray: 
The Misappropriation Alternative, 3 CoMPUTER LAW. 1 (1986). Arguably, the Wil-
liams court's real concern was that the defendant had advance access to plaintiffs work, 
and thus the infringing program was an unauthorized use. See, e.g., Whitfield v. Lear, 
751 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1984) (recognizing implied in fact contract theory); cf Koontz v. 
Jaffarian, 787 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1986) (defendant infringed plaintiffs copyright by 
copying information from a copyrighted manual, and also by using algorithms that 
plaintiff had supplied in confidence to the defendant). 
88 Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratories, 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1321 (E.D. 
Pa. 1985), affd, 797 F.2d 1222 (3d Cir. 1986) (plaintiff "has the burden of proving 
that the alleged infringing IBM-PC Dentcom program was 'copied,' and that the 'copy' 
is an improper appropriation"), relying upon Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 
(2d Cir. 1946); Klitzner Indus., Inc. v. H.K. Jones & Co., 535 F. Supp. 1249 (E.D. 
Pa. 1982). 
87 E.g., Franklin Mint Corp. v. National Wildlife Art Exch., Inc., 575 F.2d 62, 64 
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 880 (1978); Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1321; Midway 
Mfg. Co. v. Bandai-America, Inc., 546 F. Supp. 125, 146 (D.N.J. 1982); Custom De-
cor, Inc. v. Nautical Crafts, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 154, 157 (E.D. Pa. 1980); see also, e.g., 
SAS Inst., Inc. v. S&H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); 
Conley & Bryan, supra note 9; cf. Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896 (7th Cir. 1984) (strong 
similarity may be circumstantial evidence of access). 
88 In Whelan, access was established because defendant not only had access to the 
source code, but also claimed coauthorship of the plaintiffs work. "Expert testimony as 
to similarity is clearly appropriate." Whelan, 609 F. Supp. at 1321. Here the expert 
gave a "detailed and thorough analysis of the many similarities." Id. at 1322. The 
court also noted that "the visual screens that are displayed are almost identical in for-
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there was a "substantial" copying of protected material. Literal simi-
larity between the copyrighted work and the allegedly infringing pro-
gram supports an infringement claim.69 Direct or literal copying can 
constitute infringement even if it accounts for only a small portion of 
the copyrighted program. For example, a court held that literal copying 
of less than one fortieth of one percent of a copyrighted program's code 
constituted infringement.70 
One writer suggests that in addition to such a "literal" approach to 
determining infringement, the courts should also take a structural anal-
ysis approach.71 The structural approach focuses not only on the pro-
gram code's word by word instructions, but also on the logic and organ-
ization of the commands and subroutines within the program. A 
structural approach would arguably provide a sound way to protect the 
code's expression. However, to the extent that the program's structure 
is functional, copyright laws may not offer protection, since a functional 
program's structure falls within the public domain of ideas.72 
mat and even in use of abbreviations and terminology." Id. at 1322. Finally the court 
noted that the defendant "lacked the ability to create on his own, or even with the help 
of a skilled programmer in correcting his errors, a workable system, especially one that 
is almost an exact duplicate of the system of [the plaintiff)." Id. at 1322. 
One lesson of the Whelan decision is that a program that is neither copy protected 
nor contains encrypted code, thus giving the user access to the copyrighted code, may be 
circumstantial evidence of copying when looking at a substantially similar subsequent 
work. The practical trade-off is that the lack of a copy protection scheme increases the 
likelihood of widespread infringement (e.g., piracy). 
89 See, e.g., Koontz v. Jaffarian, 787 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1986), affg 617 F. Supp. 
1108 (E.D. Va. 1985) (similarity including reproduction of errors in the copyrighted 
work established infringement); see Note, Copyright Protection, supra note 8, at 512-
13; see also, e.g., Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 752 (N.D. Ill. 1983) 
(89 to 97 percent identity constituted infringement). 
70 See Note, Copyright Protection, supra note 8, at 512 (relying on SAS Inst., Inc. v. 
S&H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816, 822, 830 (M.D. Tenn. 1985)); cf. In re 
Certain Personal Computers and Components Thereof, 1983-84 Copyright Law Dec. 
[CCH] § 25,651 at 18,927-29 (Int') Trade Comm'n March 9, 1984) (18 to 25 percent 
identity indicates infringement). 
71 Note, Copyright Protection, supra note 8, at 529. 
11 See, e.g., Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Phillips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 
616 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982) ("similarity of expression ... which 
necessarily results from the fact that the common idea is only capable of expression in 
more or less stereotyped form will preclude a finding of actionable similarity") ( quoting 
from 3 M. NIMMER, supra note 25, at 13-20; NATIONAL CoMM'N ON TECHNOLOGI-
CAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, FINAL REPORT 21 (1978); see also supra notes 
6-7. But cf Broderbund Software, Inc. v. Unison World, Inc., 231 U.S.P.Q. 700 (N.D. 
Cal. 1986) (indicating that infringement can be based on similarity in "touch and feel" 
of the programs). 
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As noted above, similarity in appearance is relevant only if the ap-
pearance itself is copyrightable. Even apart from the code, there can be 
a copyright in the visual screens as an audiovisual work. 73 But the 
scope of audiovisual protection is much less predictable than other types 
of copyright protection. 
While the law is well established that only the expression is copy-
rightable and the ideas expressed are not, the rule is more easily stated 
than applied. As one court explained: 
[I)t is as clear an infringement to translate a computer program from, for 
example, FORTRAN to ALGOL, as it is to translate a novel or play 
from English to French. In each case the substance of the expression (if 
one may speak in such contradictory language) is the same between origi-
nal and copy, with only the external manifestation of the expression 
changing. Likewise, it would probably be a violation to take a detailed 
description of a particular problem solution, such as a flowchart or step-
by-step set of prose instructions, written in human language, and program 
such a description in computer language. But here the similarity to liter-
ary translation ends. The preparation of a computer program in any lan-
guage from a general description of the problem to be solved (as, for ex-
ample, is contained in the forms and manuals, which prescribe a problem 
involving a set of ordered inputs in a particular arrangement which must 
be accepted by the computer and transmitted to the FRAN program) is 
very dissimilar to the translation of a program from one language to an-
other. In most cases, the formulation of the problem in sufficient detail 
and with sufficient precision to enable it to be converted into an unambig-
uous set of computer instructions requires substantial imagination, creativ-
ity, independent thought, and exercise of discretion, and the resulting pro-
gram can in no way be said to be merely a copy or version of the problem 
statement. The program and the statement are so different, both in physi-
cal characteristics and in intended purpose, that they are really two differ-
ent expressions of the same idea, rather than two different versions of the 
same expression. Hence EDI's preparation of a FORTRAN preprocessor 
program from the descriptions contained in the manuals cannot constitute 
an infringing derivative use provided this was done without copying of the 
plaintiffs FORTRAN program, as it was.74 
78 M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986) (dealing with 
both source code and audiovisual copyright of poker videogame); Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 109 F.R.D. 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (infringement of Donkey 
Kong video game based on substantial similarity of (1) repetitive sequences of sight and 
sound as an audiovisual work, (2) characters, (3) "tone and feel," and (4) the interac-
tion of the characters, obstacles, background, and music; the court found infringement 
by viewing the work as a whole); see, e.g., Atari, 672 F.2d at 607; Midway Mfg. Co. v. 
Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (finding infringement of source code as a 
"literary work," but no infringement of visual display as an audiovisual work). 
74 Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003, 
1013 n.5 (N.D. Tex. 1978). · 
124 University of California, Davis [Vol. 20: 105 
Accordingly, showing an infringement based on the source code (or the 
object code) requires showing that a copying took place. 
Although access to the copyrighted code is necessary to prove a direct 
copying, it is far from sufficient even when there is some similarity in 
the allegedly infringing product. Line-by-line similarity of the pro-
gramming code establishes an infringement.711 Strong similarity of ex-
pression, even without a line-by-line correlation, can also establish an 
infringement.76 An infringing copy or derivative work exists when one 
work is copied from another but the similarities are disguised.77 
Detailed reverse engineering does not establish infringement when 
the alleged infringer only analyzes the copyrighted code and borrows 
some of the ideas without copying the copyrighted expression thereof.78 
75 E.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1245 
(3d Cir. 1983), cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984). See generally Conley & Bryan, 
supra note 9. 
76 E.F. Johnson Co. v. Uniden Corp., 623 F. Supp. 1485, 1497 (D. Minn. 1985) 
(programs did not have line-by-line similarity, but court still found infringement be-
cause literal translation from one language to another "necessarily involved a skewing 
of the program such that line-by-line comparison becomes meaningless"). Frequently 
expert testimony is necessary to establish similarity. See, e.g., SAS Inst., Inc. v. S&H 
Computer Sys., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. Tenn. 1985). 
77 E.F. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1485; Merideth Corp. v. Harper & Row Publish-
ers, Inc., 413 F. Supp. 385,388 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (alterations in literary work); see also 
Conley & Bryan, supra note 9, at 599: 
Although there is little or no relevant case law, the new Act's definition of 
derivative work again is helpful. If plagiarism followed by disingenuous 
alteration is not the creation of an authorized derivative work, what is? 
The focus once again is on the defendant's conduct; the relevant inquiry is 
whether he based his program on or adapted it from a preexisting pro-
gram. If the plaintiff shows that the defendant initially appropriated both 
ideas and expression, derived substantial benefit from doing so, and then 
made "colorable alterations . . . to disguise the piracy" without contribut-
ing substantial original expression, it will be fully consistent with tradi-
tional copyright principles to find the defendant liable because of his be-
havior. (footnotes omitted) (quoting from Tennessee Fabricating Co. v. 
Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279, 284 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 
928 (1970)). 
Cf Hubco Data Prods. Corp. v. Management Assistance, Inc., 219 U.S.P.Q. 450 (D. 
Idaho 1983) (preliminary injunction against making copies as a first step in creating, a 
work modifying plaintiffs program). 
76 E.F. Johnson, 623 F. Supp. at 1501 n.17, wherein the court observed: 
The mere fact that defendant's engineers dumped, flow charted, and ana-
lyzed plaintiffs work does not in and of itself establish pirating. . . . Had 
[defendant] contented itself with surveying the general outline of the 
[plaintiffs] program, thereafter converting the scheme into detailed code 
through its own imagination, creativity and independent thought, [a claim 
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As one commentator explains: 
If disassembly leads to the creation of a final product that is not substan-
tially similar to the original program, consumers will be enriched by a 
wider choice of programs. Their options are enhanced at the expense of 
the owner of the original copyright, who will find the scope of his monop-
oly narrowed. But copyright law inevitably balances the proprietor's inter-
est in protection against the public's interest in disclosure. For example, 
copyright law protects only expression and not ideas so that the public can 
profit by using the ideas in copyrighted works. 79 
125 
Of course, as observed earlier,80 establishing at what point the idea 
ends and the expression begins is not always easy. 
a. Protection for Computer Audiovisual Works 
As pointed out above, even apart from the source and object codes, 
copyright protection may attach to what appears on the screen if it 
qualifies as a copyrightable audiovisual work.81 This copyright protec-
tion for audiovisual works is much less predictable than protection for 
source and object codes. A purely functional visual screen is not copy-
rightable as an audiovisual work, and thus may be copied to another 
program (assuming the copier does not look to the source code as the 
basis for her copy).82 Since copyright law does not extend to ideas and 
does not protect utilitarian functions,88 command codes that are func-
tional descriptions of an idea are not a copyrightable expression.84 
of infringement would not have arisen). 
79 Note, Copyright Protection, supra note 8, at 518. 
80 See, e.g., Williams v. Arndt, 227 U.S.P.Q. 615 (D. Mass. 1985); supra notes 30-
32 and accompanying text. 
81 E.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1986); Stern 
Elec., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982) (rejecting argument that user 
input that changes the screen image renders the programs' repetitive series of images 
not copyrightable). 
82 See S&H Computer Sys., Inc., v. SAS Inst., Inc. 568 F. Supp. 416 (M.D. Tenn. 
1983); Synercom Technology v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 1003 (N.D. 
Tex. 1978). 
88 See generally Denicola, Applied Art and Industrial Design: A Suggested Ap-
proach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN. L. REV. 707 (1983). Novel utilita-
rian designs may be subject to design patent protection. See Frijouf, Simultaneous 
Copyright and Patent Protection, 23 COPYRIGHT L. SvMP. (AS CAP) 99 (1977). 
However, patent protection for computer programs is highly problematic. See Diamond 
v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981); Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gottschalk v. 
Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); In re Meyer, 688 F.2d 789 (C.C.P.A. 1982); REPORT OF 
THE PRESIDENT'S CoMM'N, supra note 7, at 13 (patent laws inappropriate for soft-
ware protection). See generally supra notes 6-7. 
84 E.g., Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Bally Mfg. Corp., 568 F. Supp. 1274, 1278-81 
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However, even without a copyright infringement, there can be viola-
tions of state unfair competition law. Subject to preemption by federal 
copyright law, there can also be violations of the state law of misappro-
priation, which bars reaping profits from seeds that one did not sow. 811 
Further, section 43(a) of the Lanham Act,86 which prohibits certain 
methods of unfair competition, prevents disparaging the original prod-
uct or creating confusion as to its source.87 
In light of the various copyright doctrines discussed above, predicting 
when a new work borrows ideas from a copyrighted work is extremely 
difficult. Equally challenging is predicting how close the new work can 
come to the original without becoming an infringing derivative work. 
Cases dealing with the borrowing and modifying of literary characters 
shed some light upon this issue. For example, a court held that the 
television show The Greatest American Hero did not infringe upon the 
copyrights relating to Superman. 88 Although both stories revolved 
around a crime-stopping super hero dressed in a cape, and maintaining 
a secret identity, this was insufficient to make the second work an in-
fringing derivative of the first. 89 The Greatest American Hero's status 
as a parody buttressed the finding of no infringement.90 But what if the 
(N.D. Ill. 1983); SAS Inst., 568 F. Supp. at 416, 422-23. See generally Wharton, Use 
and Expression: The Scope of Copyright Protection for Computer Programs, 5 CoM-
PUTER L.J. 433, 454-67 (1985). 
85 See generally 2 L. ALTMAN & R. CALLMAN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADE· 
MARKS, AND MONOPOLIES § 15.01 (1981) [hereafter CALLMAN]; infra text accompa-
nying notes 131-38. 
88 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1982) (prohibiting false designations of origin and false 
descriptions of goods or services). 
87 See, e.g., M. Kramer Mfg. Co. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 447-50 (4th Cir. 1986) 
(discussing "trade dress infringement" of console for video game). 
88 Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Cos., 720 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1983). 
89 In Warner Bros., the court pointed out that The Greatest American Hero was not 
a direct copy. Id. at 244. Further, any borrowing from the copyrighted Superman was 
in a satirical vein: 
[T]he announcer says that Hinkley 'may be unable to leap tall buildings 
in a single bound,' 'may be slower than a speeding bullet,' and 'may be 
less powerful than a locomotive.' We do not doubt that some viewers may 
miss the point, but their misunderstanding does not establish infringement. 
Perhaps if Hero were a children's series, aired on Saturday mornings 
among the cartoon programs, we would have greater concern for the risk 
that lines intended to contrast Hinkley with Superman might be mistak-
enly understood to suggest that Hero was a Superman Program. 
Id. at 247. The court also rejected a Lanham Act claim. 
90 Hero also involved the special rule relating to parody and fair use. See, e.g., Ber-
lin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.) (take-offs "The First Time I Saw 
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second work had also involved a newspaper reporter with a romantic 
affiliation to a co-reporter, a young naive photographer, and a crusty 
white-haired editor? That would have come much closer to being an 
infringing work. 
The line of cases dealing with copyright protection for literary and 
comic book characters91 impact the protection of computer software 
Maris" and "Louella Schwartz Describes Her Malady" did not infringe "The Last 
Time I Saw Paris" and "A Pretty Girl is Like a Melody"), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 
(1964); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. 
Cal. 1955) (satirical From Here to Obscurity did not infringe From Here to Eternity); 
cf. Universal City Studios, Inc. v. T-Shirt Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1468 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986) ("Miami Mice" t-shirts did not infringe copyright for Miami Vice television se-
ries). But see Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978) (X-
rated copies of Disney characters held not protected by fair use since the characters 
were copied directly; relief was based on copyright infringement - trade disparage-
ment, trademark infringement, and unfair competition claims were remanded), cert. 
denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956) 
(satirical burlesque production Autolight did infringe Gaslight), ajf d, 356 U.S. 43 
(1958); Original Artworks, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 642 F. Supp. 1031 (N.D. 
Ga. 1986) (preliminary injunction against Garbage Pail Kids' infringement on Cab-
bage Patch Kids); DC Comics, Inc. v. Unlimited Monkey Business, Inc., 598 F. Supp. 
110 (N.D. Ga. 1984) ("Super Stud" and "Wonder Wench" costumes for singing tele-
grams, when characters had similar costumes and borrowed dialogue from Superman 
and Wonder Woman, held infringement since the parody went beyond permissible fair 
use). See generally Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark, 
and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U.L. REV. 923 (1985). 
91 Even apart from the context of the satire or parody issue, the mere taking of a 
general idea cannot constitute copyright infringement. See, e.g., National Comics Publi-
cations, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, Inc., 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951) (Captain Mar-
vel did not infringe Superman's copyright). Compare, e.g., Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. 
v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., 216 F.2d 945, 950-51 (9th Cir. 1954) (copyright pro-
tection not granted to the Sam Spade character; literary characters merely vehicles for 
telling story not copyrightable), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 971 (1955) and Nichols v. Uni-
versal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119, 122-23 (2d Cir. 1930) (general traits of stock char-
acters in Abie's Irish Rose not protected by copyright), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 902 
(1931) with Filmvideo Releasing Corp. v. Hastings, 509 F. Supp. 60, 66 (S.D.N.Y. 
1981); modified on other grounds, 668 F.2d 91 (2d Cir. 1981) (Hopalong Cassidy and 
his pals Lucky; Windy, and Johnny all held sufficiently developed to be protected by 
copyright). See also, e.g., Sid & Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's 
Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1175 (9th Cir. 1977) (McDonaldland commercials held to in-
fringe "H.R. Pufnstuf' characters from children's television show). 
However, courts may find infringment when more than the idea is involved and the 
characters are directly copied with a great degree of detail. See Detective Comics, Inc. 
v. Bruns Publications, Inc., 111 F.2d 432, 433 (2d Cir. 1940) (Wonderman held to 
infringe Superman when defendant copied copyrighted pictures and literary form); 
Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 632 F. Supp. 1344 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (extending copyright pro-
tection to audiovisual depiction of Amos 'n' Andy characters, although scripts are in 
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containing unique identifiable screen images or characters. For exam-
ple, although the concept of the Pac-Man game is not copyrightable, 
the use of ghost monsters such as "gobbler" for the central figures dis-
tinguishes the game from others. The ghost monsters are sufficiently 
fanciful to merit protection against appropriation by someone else. 92 
Copyright protection of screen images (assuming that they are fanciful 
as opposed to utilitarian) as an audiovisual work93 is analogous to the 
protection given to cartoon figures. This protection is generally greater 
than the protection afforded literary characters. 
3. Use of Contractual Provisions to Help Define the Extent of 
Protection 
The as yet undefined scope of the "derivative work" concept makes it 
difficult to predict how much borrowing of ideas, formats, plot lines 
and characters can take place before a work based on prior copyrighted 
work becomes an infringing derivative work. Within the context of 
computer software, the separate treatment of a program's audiovisual 
aspects further compound the problem of defining the scope of copy-
right protection. Most of the cases discussed in the preceding section 
that have successfully established a copyright infringement involve ei-
public domain); see also, e.g., Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 755 
(9th Cir. 1978) (characters ordinarily not copyrightable, but "comic book character 
... [with) physical and conceptual qualities ... likely to contain some unique ele-
ments of expression"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979). See generally Note, The 
Protection Afforded Literary and Cartoon Characters Through Trademark, Unfair 
Competition and Copyright, 68 HARV. L. REV. 349 (1954). 
In the words of a recent ruling, decided under the former Copyright Act: 
Cartoons, and other graphic representations of characters, have been af-
forded greater copyright protection than characters described only by 
words . . . . Copyright protection has been found appropriate for charac-
ters visually depicted in a movie . . . . [W)e must consider a novel issue: 
are characters that are in the public domain in a literary work protectable 
by copyright in an audiovisual presentation? We believe they are. The 
visual representation of these characters, recorded on film, is the expres-
sion of an idea that goes beyond the word portraits in the public domain 
scripts and is, therefore, protectable by copyright . . . . 
Silverman, 632 F. Supp. at 1355 (citations omitted). 
92 Atari, Inc. v. North Am. Philips Consumer Elecs. Corp., 672 F.2d 607, 617-18 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 880 (1982); see, e.g., Williams Elecs., Inc. v. Artie 
Int'!, Inc., 685 F.2d 870, 876 (3d Cir. 1982) (upholding validity of copyright for DE-
FENDER video game). 
88 Stern Elec., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982); Universal City Stu-
dios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., No. 82 Civ. 4259 (RWS) (S.D.N.Y. July 29, 1985); see 
supra text accompanying note 36. 
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ther ( 1) direct copying, proven in some cases by circumstantial evidence 
of access to the protected programming code, or (2) second works by 
persons participating in or otherwise having access to the developmen-
tal processes of the original piece of software. 
The current statutory framework may be too general to permit more 
predictable guidelines for potential infringers. Such uncertainty may be 
desirable to the extent that it forces caution on the borrower and 
thereby the would-be infringer. However, a vague standard may create 
the need for more explicit statutory definition. This seems unlikely in 
light of the recent overhaul of the copyright legislation. Divining a 
more predictable pattern will no doubt take the courts many years of 
interpretation under the Copyright Act. In the interim, software devel-
opers can - by taking care in drafting contractual provisions with per-
sons participating in the development process - better define the scope · 
of their proprietary interests. While contractual provisions cannot, of 
course, define the scope of the statutory meaning of derivative work, 
they can establish the parties' understanding as to what is the property 
of the copyright owner. State contract law may recognize such contrac-
tual expectations, supplemented by other legal theories. For example, 
by attempting to define the types of programming processes or tech-
niques incorporated in the program, the contract may provide protec-
tion under trade secret or misappropriation law. 
There are two obvious limits to relying on contracts to counteract 
uncertainty over what constitutes a derivative work or what constitutes 
protectable expression. First, the contracting parties cannot extend re-
strictions to program users without their consent. Second, courts should 
invalidate contracts attempting to expand the· intellectual property's 
protection too far beyond the parameters of copyright law on the 
grounds of statutory preemption, or as against public policy.94 The law 
of trade secrets and misappropriation, discussed below, may give at 
least limited additional protection on appropriate facts. 
C. Trade Secret Protection and Misappropriation 
1. Trade Secret Law 
As pointed out above, copyright law does not protect ideas; it protects 
only the expression of ideas. Accordingly, something functional or utili-
tarian cannot be the subject of copyright protection, whether it is a 
work of art&& or a functional aspect of a computer program.96 As dis-
a. See infra text accompanying notes 196-200. 
•a See generally Denicola, supra note 83. 
" See supra text accompanying note 79. 
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cussed above, a limited supplemental protection may extend to the ways 
in which the images are produced on the screen, or to input commands, 
so long as they are not purely functional. By contrast, patent laws pro-
tect novel utilitarian inventions.97 However, whether patent laws will, 
grant meaningful protection to computer programs is extremely doubt-
ful.98 One way to fill the gap thus created by patent and copyright law 
is through trade secret protection.99 Trade secret law is embodied both 
in common law and in some state statutes.100 
The law of trade secrets can protect matters not subject to copyright 
protection. In the context of a computer program, for example, trade 
secret protection can safeguard the code underlying subroutines within 
programs such as user friendly menus, on-line help screens, or random 
number generation. When such a program is not copyrightable, trade 
secret law would provide protection even if its protections extend to the 
ideas and functions contained in the program. 101 In programming, 
value is often contained in the programmer's ideas of how to present 
the code in such a way as to produce a desired result, rather than the 
particular expression in the code. For example, a programmer wishing 
to develop the most efficient algorithm to create an on-screen menu 
may face several alternatives for setting up such a subroutine. If after a 
great deal of time and effort a programmer comes up with a routine to 
create a menu that works quickly and efficiently, the resulting process 
(and design of the flow chart) are ideas, and thus not subject to copy-
right protection. 
Trade secret protection is useful in such a situation only when the 
ideas are not reproducible merely by looking at the finished product. 
Furthermore, absent a contractual relationship between the parties, the 
97 35 u.s.c. §§ 1-376 (1982). 
98 See supra notes 5-7 and accompanying text. 
99 See generally R. MILGRIM, 12, 12A BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS, R. MILGRIM ON 
TRADE SECRETS§§ 1.01-.03 (1981); Bender, Trade Secret Protection of Software, 38 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 909 (1970); Gilburne & Johnston, Trade Secret Protection for 
Software Generally and in the Mass Market, 3 COMPUTER LAW J. 211 (1982); Note, 
The Copyrightability of Computer Software Containing Trade Secrets, 63 WASH. 
U.L.Q. 131 (1985). 
100 E.g., RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1982); UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT, 
ABA SECTION OF PATENT, TRADEMARK, AND COPYRIGHT LAW, 1973 CoMM. RE-
PORTS 179-82. Many statutes provide that theft of trade secrets is a crime. E.g., CAL. 
PENAL CODE§ 499c (West 1967 & Supp. 1986); see also People v. Gopal, 171 Cal. 
App. 3d 524, 217 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1985). 
101 E.g., Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 462 F. Supp. 
1003, 1013 n.5 (N.D. Tex. 1978), quoted supra in text accompanying note 74. 
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trade secret protection will not prohibit reverse engineering. Any per-
son rightfully possessing a product or a process subject to trade secret 
protection niay, through the process of reverse engineering or other-
wise, reproduce the ideas and functions not protected by the patent 
laws. 102 This means that absent a strong copy protection scheme or en-
forceable contractual restrictions, computer functions and subroutines 
may be reproduced without infringing the creator's rights so long as 
there is not a direct copying of the expression. Hackers can break down 
protection schemes; thus, contractual provisions will be necessary to 
provide the basis for any significant trade secret protection. 
a. De.fining Trade Secret Law 
At this point, presenting a brief overview of trade secret law may 
prove helpful. Simply put, a trade secret is an idea or a process that 
gives the owner a competitive advantage over others who do not have 
access to the secret. 103 A classic example of a trade secret is the formula 
for Coca-Cola. The Coca-Cola formula is not protected by a patent, 
but has not been reproducible over a period of decades. The obvious 
advantage to trade secret protection in such a situation is that it extends 
beyond the limited period that would govern a patented process.104 
Similarly, as pointed out above, the primary advantage of trade secret 
protection in the computer software context is that it protects ideas and 
processes that may not be subject to either patent or copyright laws. 1011 
101 See, e.g., Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,490 (1974); Raskind, 
Reverse Engineering, Unfair Competition, and Fair Use, 70 MINN. L. REV. 385 
(1985) (discussing the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984, which, unlike pat-
ent laws, expressly permits reproduction through reverse engineering for ROM masks 
protected under 1984 Act); see also R. MILGRAM, supra note 99, at § 504(1). 
103 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939) provides: "A trade secret 
may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information which is used 
in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an advantage over 
competitors who do not know or use it"; see also, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Sipula, 
776 F.2d 157, 162-65 (7th Cir. 1985); Syntex Ophthalmics, Inc. v. Tsuetaki, 701 F.2d 
677, 684 (7th Cir. 1983); FMC Corp. v. Varco Int'!, Inc., 677 F.2d 500, 502-03 (5th 
Cir. 1982); Sikes v. McGraw-Edison Co., 665 F.2d 731, 733 (5th Cir. 1982); Palin 
Mfg. Co. v. Water Technology, 103 Ill. App. 3d 926, 930, 431 N.E.2d 1310, 1314 
(1982); K & G Oil Tool & Serv. Co. v. G & G Fishing Tool Serv., 158 Tex. 594, 605, 
314 S.W.2d 782, 789 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958). Not all courts follow 
the Restatement in requiring that the trade secret be shown to give a competitive ad-
vantage. E.g., Victor Chem. Works v. Iliff, 299 Ill. 532, 132 N.E. 806 (1921). 
104 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1982) (17 years). 
1011 In this regard there may be some question as to whether trade secret protection is 
preempted by the federal copyright and patent laws. See infra text accompanying notes 
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According to the original Restatement of Torts, in order to guarantee 
trade secret protection courts will consider the degree of secrecy, and 
the measures taken to protect the secrecy of the process or formula. 106 
While a few courts have also required that the process be "novel,"107 
most have not.108 However, one court suggested that, at least in com-
puter software cases, the process or idea must to some extent be "origi-
nal or novel": 109 
Courts agree that trade secrets lie somewhere on a continuum from what 
is generally known in a field to what has some degree of uniqueness, al-
though there need not be the degree of novelty or originality required for 
copyright protection. Within these limits, courts have suggested a variety 
of further limitations. Some measure of discovery is required. Mere varia-
tions in general processes known in the field which embody no superior 
advances are not protected. But unique principles, engineering, logic and 
coherence in computer software may be accorded trade secret status. And a 
trade secret may modify and improve standard models to a point at which 
112-16. 
108 Under the RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939), courts should 
evaluate a claimant's right to trade secret protection in light of the following six factors: 
( 1) the extent to which the information is known outside of his business; 
(2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others involved in 
his business; (3) the extent of measures taken by him to guard the secrecy 
of the information; ( 4) the value of the information to him and to his 
competitors; (5) the amount of effort or money expended by him in devel-
oping the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the informa-
tion could be properly acquired or duplicated by others. 
This test has been adopted in the computer program context. See, e.g., University Com-
puting Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 534 (5th Cir. 1974); Q-Co 
Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 616-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Structural Dy-
namics Research Corp. v. Engineering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. S~pp. 1102 
(E.D. Mich. 1975); Com-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229, 
1234 (E.D. Mich. 1971), affd per curiam, 458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972); Cybertek 
Computer Prods., Inc. v. Whitfield, 203 U.S.P.Q. [BNA] 1020, 1023 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
1977); Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691, 698-99 (Minn. 
1982); Computer Print Sys., Inc. v. Lewis, 422 A.2d 148, 153 n.3, 281 Pa. Super. 240, 
245 n.3 (1980); Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lindley, 609 P.2d 733, 744 (Okla. 1980); J & K 
Computer Sys., Inc. v. Parrish, 642 P.2d 732 (Utah 1982). 
107 Q-Co Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also 
In re Innovative Constr. Sys., Inc., 788 F.2d 1260 (7th Cir. 1986). 
108 E.g., Kodekey Elecs., Inc. v. Mechanex Corp., 486 F.2d 449, 455 (10th Cir. 
1973); Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc. v. Rowland, 460 F.2d 697, 700 (4th Cir. 1972); 
Clark v. Bunker, 453 F.2d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 1972); Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. 
Pillsbury Co., 452 F.2d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 1971); Dickerman Assocs., Inc. v. Tiverton 
Bottled Gas Co., 594 F. Supp. 30 (D. Mass. 1984); Structural Dynamics, 401 F. 
Supp. at 1117; see R. MILGRIM supra note 99, at § 2.08(2). 
109 Gilburne & Johnston, supra note 99, at 215. 
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the newer version is unique in the industry. 
Further, generally known computer elements may gain trade secret pro-
tection from the nature of their combination. 110 
133 
The court's analysis allows an interesting comparison with the con-
cept of "derivative work" under the copyright laws. As pointed out ear-
lier, 111 the law prohibits unauthorized adaptations and modifications 
when a work is copyrighted. On the other hand, when a work is modi-
fied along the lines described above, the derivative work may enjoy 
trade secret protection if the person making the modifications has not 
violated the owner's rights. Presumably, if the person making ti1e modi-
fications has taken someone else's trade secret, the new product violates 
the original creator's rights. Similarly, an authorized derivative work of 
a copyrighted program, or a derivative work based on something in the 
public domain, qualifies for copyright protection of the expression but 
not the ideas embodied therein. One must rely on trade secret law to 
protect the expression. 
b. Applying Trade Secret Law 
The interplay between the trade secret protections and those afforded 
under the Copyright Act raise some question as to whether the Act 
preempts trade secret law.112 The Act's legislative hi.story strongly sug-
gests that it was intended to preempt only the common law of copy-
right, and not analogous rights such as trade secret law. 113 This seems 
the better view, since copyright laws protect only expression, and trade 
secret laws cover ideas and processes. 114 
110 Jostens, Inc. v. National Computer Sys., Inc., 318 N.W.2d 691, 698-99 (Minn. 
1982) (denying trade secret protection for lack of uniqueness). As one commentator 
explained Jostens, "if the uniqueness of software does not extend beyond the form of 
expression of known algorithms to achieve previously produced results (with no mate-
rial advancements involved), trade secret protection may be denied." Davidson, Protect-
ing Computer Software: A Comprehensive Analysis, 1983 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 611, 722 
(footnote omitted). 
m See supra text accompanying notes 45-48. 
111 The Act expressly preempts state law that gives rights "equivalent" to federal 
copyright protection. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982). For a description of the legislative history 
see Davidson, supra note 110, at 743-44. 
118 See, e.g., Warrington Assocs., Inc. v. Real-Time Eng'g Sys., Inc., 522 F. Supp. 
367 (N.D. Ill. 1981); M. Bryce & Assocs., Inc. v. Gladstone, 319 N.W.2d 907 (Wis. 
App.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 944 (1982). · 
rn Conley & Bryan, supra note 9, at 576-77; Davidson, supra note 110, at 744-47. 
This view is bolstered by the fact that patent laws do not preempt state trade secret 
protection even though both are based on the protection of ideas and processes. 
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). 
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Accordingly, preemption is likely to be a problem only when 
software creators invoke trade secret laws merely to prevent the copying 
of expression, without the misappropriation elements normally attached 
to a trade secret claim. uci For example, some scholars argue that the 
Copyright Act does not preempt trade secret law provided that proof of 
secrecy and confidentiality is an element of the state law protection. 
They assert that preemption should bar trade secret protection for mass 
marketed programs when confidentiality cannot be maintained. 116 
A matter of common knowledge cannot, of course, qualify for trade 
secret protection. On the other hand, absolute secrecy is not required. 117 
That the object code is not a secret does not prevent trade secret protec-
tion for the source code. 118 Copyright registration results in at least a 
m Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs., 564 F. Supp. 1471, 1476-77 (D. Nev. 1983); 
Avco Corp. v. Precision Air Parts, Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q. 894 (M.D. Ala. 1980), afj'd on 
other grounds, 676 F.2d 494 (1 Ith Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1037 (1982), later 
appeal, 736 F.2d 1499 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 744 F.2d 97 (11th Cir. 1984), cert. 
denied, 469 U.S. 1191 (1985); see also Ehat v. Tanner, 780 F.2d 876, 878 (10th Cir. 
1986); Financial Information, Inc., v. Moody's Investors Serv., Inc., 751 F.2d 501, 510 
(2d Cir. 1984); Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management Sys., Inc., 591 F. Supp. 
726, 739 (N.D. Ill. 1983); infra text accompanying notes 142-47. 
118 See 1 M. NIMMER, supra note 25, at § 1.0t[B]; Note, Copyright Protection, 
supra note 8, at 505-06; supra text accompanying notes 101-03; cf Whitfield v. Lear, 
751 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1984) (misappropriation of ideas actionable when ideas submitted 
in context justifying recovery under implied-in-fact contract theory). 
117 In the words of one court: 
Although information that is generally known cannot be a trade secret, 
Ferber v. Sterndent Corp., St N.Y.2d 782,433 N.Y.S.2d 85,412 N.E.2d 
1311 (1980), absolute secrecy is not required. Fairchild Engine and Air-
plane Corp. v. Cox, 50 N.Y.S.2d 643 (Sup. Ct. 1944). As noted by this 
Circuit: 
The rule is only that a "substantial element of secrecy must exist 
and this means so much that" except by use of improper means, 
there would be difficulty in acquiring the information. A.H. Emery 
Co. v. Marean Prods. Corp., 389 F.2d 11, 16 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 393 U.S. 835, 89 S. Ct. 109, 21 L.Ed.2d 106 (1968). 
Q-Co Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also, e.g., 
University Computing Co. v. Lykes-Youngstown Corp., 504 F.2d 518, 534-35 (5th 
Cir. 1974) (computer program protected as trade secret); Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd. v. 
National Distillers & Chem. Corp., 342 F.2d 737, 742 (2d Cir. 1965) (unique combi-
nation of publicly known component parts creates protectable trade secret). 
118 Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 911, 928-930 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 
423 U.S. 802 (1975); Q-Co Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 617-18 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); Com-Share, Inc. v. Computer Complex, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 1229, 
1234-35 (E.D. Mich. 1971), afj'd, 458 F.2d 1341 (6th Cir. 1972); McGrody, Protec-
tion of Computer Software - An Update and Practical Synthesis, 20 Haus. L. REV. 
1033, 1063 (1983). 
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limited disclosure of a computer program,119 and there is thus some 
tension between the copyright laws and trade secret protection. There-
fore, registering a copyright may significantly limit what can effectively 
be kept secret. 
Several persons can have access to the trade secret without destroying 
a claim of secrecy if they have taken a pledge of confidentiality.120 
However, contractual pledges of secrecy by the purchaser or licensee of 
mass marketed software may not, as a practical matter, be sufficient. In 
terms of defining the scope of secrecy required, the question may arise 
as to whether the attempt to preserve secrecy in the context of mass-
marketed licensing agreements will be eff ective. 121 
Trade secret protection claimants must demonstrate that they have 
made efforts to keep the secret and to police and protect against 
breaches of the secret. 122 The measures taken to preserve secrecy fall 
into two categories: in-house protection and measures taken with re-
spect to third parties. A proprietor of a trade secret can attempt to 
maintain secrecy in a number of ways. These include: contracting for 
employment agreements requiring confidentiality; maintaining proce-
dures to protect the secrecy of confidential documents; permitting dis-
closure to third parties only under written agreements assuring confi-
dentiality; monitoring security breaches; and policing trade secret 
agreements through judicial enforcement. 123 
In-house protection schemes relate primarily to security systems and 
contractual arrangements with employees that restrict use of confiden-
119 The first and last 25 pages or equivalent units must be filed with the Copyright 
Office. 37 C.F.R. § 302.20(c)(2)(vii) (1986); see Davidson, supra note 110, at 736-41 
(discussing techniques to limit the disclosures resulting from copyright registration). 
One such technique is to deposit only the object code to preserve trade secret protection 
for the source code. See Telex Corp. v. IBM, 510 F.2d 894, 928-30 (10th Cir. 1975). 
no Board of Trade v. Christie, 198 U.S. 236, 250-51 (1905); Data Gen. Corp. v. 
Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 357 A.2d 105 (Del. Ch. 1975). 
111 Compare Conley & Bryan, supra note 9, at 575 ("[w)ide distribution of software 
does not foreclose trade secret protection, as long as each recipient is party to an agree-
ment that creates a confidential relationship and substantially limits disclosure of those 
aspects of the software deemed proprietary") with Einhorn, supra note 25, at 526 
("(c]ourts called upon to enforce publisher's rights in trade secrecy will ... have to 
grapple with the problem of whether distribution of thousands of copies of software, 
where a certain portion of end users will unavoidably not be party to the license agree-
ment, is a situation incompatible with the 'secrecy' element required by the trade secret 
laws"). 
112 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 (1939). 
118 See R. MILGRIM, supra note 99, at §§ 2.04, 3.01, 7.07[1l[a); Conley & Bryan, 
supra note 9, at 573-75. 
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tial information while they remain with the employer,124 and for area-
sonable period of time after they leave. 1211 While express agreements are 
obviously preferable,126 many courts imply such agreements on appro-
priate facts. 127 Many courts draw a distinction between employee-de-
veloped trade secrets and ones that the employer merely disclosed in the 
course of employment. These courts are more likely to limit the em-
ployer's rights when the employee has developed the trade secret. In 
such circumstances, courts may permit disclosure by the employee if the 
process, not being subject to an express agreement of confidentiality, 
became a part of the knowledge and skill that the employee rightfully 
acquired incidental to her employment.126 In addition to an employ-
12
~ See R. MILGRIM, supra note 99, at §§ 3.03-3.05; Gilburne & Johnston, supra 
note 99, at 220-27. 
126 Covenants not to compete are enforceable so long as they are reasonable in scope, 
duration, and geographical reach. See, e.g., Tandy Brands, Inc. v. Harper, 760 F.2d 
648 (5th Cir. 1985); In re Talmage, 758 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1985); Sarnoff v. Ameri-
can Home Prods. Corp., 607 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Ill. 1985); Stubblefield v. Siloam 
Springs Newspapers, Inc., 590 F. Supp. 1032 (W.D. Ark. 1984). See generally Blake, 
Employee Agreements Not to Compete, 73 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1960). However, some 
states, such as California and Michigan, will not enforce such restrictive covenants. 
Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code §§ 16600-02 (West 1969); Mich. Stats. Ann. § 28.70(1),(2) 
(Callaghan 1986-87 cum. supp.). 
Courts generally view protection of a trade secret as a sufficient basis for upholding 
restrictive covenants. See Modern Controls, Inc. v. Andreadakis, 578 F.2d 1264 (8th 
Cir. 1978) (need not prove trade secret to enforce covenant not to compete); A. Hol-
lander & Son, Inc. v. Imperial Fur Blending Corp., 2 N.J. 235, 66 A.2d 319 (1949); 
see also R. MILGRIM, supra note 99, at § 3.05; Gilburne & Johnston, supra note 99, 
at 237-39. 
128 E.g., SAS Inst., Inc. v. S&H Computer Sys., Inc., 605 F. Supp. 816 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1985). 
127 E.g., Q-Co Indus., Inc. v. Hoffman, 625 F. Supp. 608, 617 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); 
Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Guardian Glass Co., 322 F. Supp. 854 (E.D. Mich. 1970), 
aff d, 462 F.2d 1115 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1039 (1972); Kaufman v. Inter-
national Business Machs. Corp., 97 A.D.2d 925, 470 N.Y.S.2d 720, 723 (1983), affd, 
61 N.Y.2d 930, 474 N.Y.S.2d 721, 463 N.E.2d 37 (1984); R. MILGRIM, supra note 
99, at §§ 502[1]-502[4]. But see, e.g., Structural Dynamics Research Corp. v. Engi-
neering Mechanics Research Corp., 401 F. Supp. 1102, 1111 (E.D. Mich. 197 5); By-
Buk Co. v. Printed Cellophane Tape Co., 163 Cal. App. 2d 157,329 P.2d 147 (1958); 
Amoco Prod. Co. v. Lindley, 609 P.2d 733, 744-45 (Okla. 1980). 
128 Futurecraft Corp. v. Clary Corp., 205 Cal. App. 2d 279, 284-86, 23 Cal. Rptr. 
198, 208-09 (1962); Wexler v. Greenberg, 399 Pa. 569, 160 A.2d 430 (1960); see also, 
e.g., Si Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1264-65 (3d Cir. 1985); Pru-
dential Ins. Co. v. Crouch, 606 F. Supp. 464, 469 (S.D. Ind. 1985); Structural Dy-
namics, 401 F. Supp. at 1111-14. But see, e.g:, Sperry Rand Corp. v. Rothlein, 241 F. 
Supp. 549, 564-65 (D.Conn. 1964) (barring employee who developed trade secret from 
disclosing it because of his "fiduciary duty"); Wireless Specialty Apparatus Co. v. Mica 
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ment relationship, the existence of a confidential or fiduciary relation-
ship can establish a duty to keep secret a process or idea disclosed in 
confidence. ue 
Once the existence of a protectable trade secret is established, the 
next question is determining the scope of the protection granted. In 
addition to permitting damages and injunctive relief for a violation of 
an express agreement by one of the parties to the agreement, courts 
may imply a confidentiality agreement. Breach of fiduciary duty can 
also form the basis of wrongful appropriation or disclosure of a trade 
secret. 180 Other wrongful activity such as theft or industrial espionage 
allows a cause of action based on trade secret law .181 Once there is 
wrongful conduct on behalf of the person misappropriating the trade 
secret, subsequent acquisition through lawful means does not preclude 
liability for violating trade secret rights.182 
2. Misappropriation 
The tort of misappropriation is another way in which the common 
law has granted some protection to intellectual property. The misap-
propriation tort operates regardless of the existence of a trade secret. It 
consists of three basic elements. First, creators claiming misappropria-
tion must show that they have devoted considerable effort to developing 
the creation. This is necessary for the court to consider the creation a 
protectable piece of property. Second, creators must show that the 
"[ d]efendant has appropriated [ the "thing"] at little or no cost, such 
that the court can characterize defendant's actions as 'reaping where it 
has not sown.' " 188 Third, plaintiffs must prove a compensable injury. 
The classic 1918 Supreme Court misappropriation case, Interna-
Condenser Co., 239 Mass. 158, 131 N.E. 307 (1921); Extrin Foods, Inc. v. Leighton, 
202 Misc. 592, 115 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1952). 
119 E.g., Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Formulations, Inc., 299 F. Supp. 202 (E.D. 
Wis. 1969), rev'd in part sub nom. Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Pillsbury Co., 452 
F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1971). 
180 See 12 R. MILGRIM, supra note 99, at§§ 3.03, 3.05(1), 503(7]. 
181 E.g., E.I. DuPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 
1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1024 (1971). 
111 Smith v. Dravo Corp., 203 F.2d 369, 374 (7th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 
898 (1958); K & G Oil Tool & Serv. Co. v. E & G Fishing Tool Serv. Co., 158 Tex. 
594, 602-03, 314 S.W.2d 782, 787-88 (1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 898 (1958); Con-
ley & Bryan, supra note 9, at 574-75. 
188 J. McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 10:25, at 322 
(1973). 
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tional News Service v. Associated Press, 13' involved Associated Press' 
(AP) allegations that a competing news service was bribing AP's em-
ployees to pass on hot news items. The Court first identified the rela-
tionship between AP's claim and the copyright laws regarding the liter-
ary character of the news items. However, there was no preemption of 
the misappropriation claim, since the defendant's conduct consisted of 
independently wrongful activity - the theft of the fruits of AP's la-
bors.1311 For the same reason, the Court held that the news items' public 
nature did not diminish AP's claim. AP was not claiming a· proprietary 
right in the information itself so as to prevent defendant from making 
any use of the news items. Rather, AP simply claimed a right to pre-
vent stealing its employees' services. Defendant could have used the sto-
ries based on its own investigation. Further, once AP disseminated its 
story, although defendant could not infringe upon the copyrighted ex-
pression, it certainly could have restated the ideas contained therein. A 
number of courts read the AP decision very narrowly based on the ra-
tionale that one cannot misappropriate information not subject to copy-
right and thus in the public domain.138 
The misappropriation theory, while retaining some vitality following 
the Associated Press case, 137 has been further limited by decisions rec-
184 248 U.S. 215 (1918). See generally Baird, Common Law Intellectual Property 
and the Legacy of International News Serv. v. Associated Press, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 
411 (1983); Rahl, The Right to "Appropriate" Trade Values, 23 OHio ST. L.J. 56 
(1962). 
188 Associated Press, 248 U.S. at 236. 
188 See, e.g., G. Ricardi & Co. v. Haendler, 194 F.2d 914 (2d Cir. 1952); National 
Comics Publications, Inc. v. Fawcett Publications, 191 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1951 ); RCA 
Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114 F.2d 86 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 712 (1940); 
Cheney Bros. v. Doris Silk Corp., 35 F.2d 279 (2d Cir. 1929), cert. denied, 281 U.S. 
728 (1930). These cases based their rationale on Justice Brandeis' Associated Press 
dissent. See Associated Press, 248 U.S. at 248. For cases dealing with the 1976 Copy-
right Act's preemptive effect, see infra notes 141-44. 
187 E.g., Standard & Poor's Corp. v. Commodity Exch., Inc., 683 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 
1982) (upholding preliminary injunction prohibiting commodity exchange from using 
Standard & Poor index for publicly traded futures contracts); Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. 
KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa. 1938) (broadcast of sporting 
event). Courts have repeatedly recognized the doctrine that "one should not be permit-
ted to reap where he has not sown." See, e.g., Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of Am., 254 
U.S. 143 (1920); Van Camp Sea Food Co. v. Stewart Org., 50 F.2d 976 (3d Cir. 
1931); CALLMAN, supra note 85, at§ 15.04; Caliman, He Who Reaps Where He Has 
Not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in the Law of Unfair Competition, 55 HARV. L. REV. 
59 5 (1942); Sell, The Doctrine of Misappropriation and Unfair Competition, 11 
V AND. L. REV. 483 (1958); Developments in the Law - Competitive Torts: Misap-
propriation of Commercial Intangibles, 77 HARV. L. REV. 888 (1964); see also, e.g., 
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ognizing that federal patent or copyright laws preempt the misappro-
priation tort to the extent that it broadens protection to intellectual 
property. 188 One court summarized the precise reach of the preemption 
doctrine in terms of what has come to be known as the subject matter 
test: 
[l)t is clear that in certain instances, an intellectual property which falls 
outside the protection of either federal copyright or patent law may still be 
found to not be entitled protection under state law regardless of theory 
because federal policy favors preemption of the area in question. It is even 
clearer, however, that a property which is subject to protection under fed-
eral patent or copyright law cannot also obtain the benefit of protection 
under either state unfair competition or misappropriation law for the same 
reasons. 189 
As discussed above, the preemption doctrine does not disable state law 
under which a plaintiff must show something more than the copying of 
intellectual property .140 In other words, at least some independent 
wrongdoing, such as the theft involved in Associated Press, is required. 
Two plaintiffs have attempted to revive the Associated Press doctrine 
within the context of computer software development. In both instances 
the claim failed. In one case the court pointed out that since the Copy-
right Act preempted the claim, the claim was based solely on the "bor-
Dawson, The Self Serving Intermeddler, 87 HARV. L. REv. 1409 (1974). 
Two writers recently suggested that misappropriation is an appropriate way to deal 
with the taking of ideas that are not subject to copyright protection. Reback & Hayes, 
Copyright Gone Astray: The Misappropriation Alternative, 3 COMPUTER LAW. 1 
(1986). 
188 E.g., Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, 
Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964). But see Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron 
Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (trade secret laws not preempted by patent laws); Gold-
stein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973) (California record piracy statute not pre-
empted by federal copyright law); see infra notes 141-43. 
189 Videotronics, Inc. v. Bend Elecs., 564 F. Supp. 1471, 1476 (D. Nev. 1983). The 
court's statement may go too far insofar as it indicates that any unfair competition 
claim would be preempted. For example, elsewhere in the opinion the court seems to 
concede that on appropriate facts, plaintiff could maintain a claim for defendant "palm-
ing ofr' plaintifrs product as the defendant's. Id. at 1477-78. With palming off, the 
plaintiff must prove a misrepresentation as to the product's source or origin and in such 
a case the law of unfair competition is unlikely to be subject to the preemption doctrine. 
140 E.g., Whitfield v. Lear, 751 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1984) (misappropriation of ideas 
actionable when ideas submitted in context justifying recovery under implied-in-fact 
contract theory); see supra text accompanying notes 112-15. But see Universal City 
Studios, Inc. v. T-Shirt Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1468, 1474-76 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) 
(state cannot regulate otherwise permissible conduct merely by categorizing it as "un-
fair" or "immoral"). 
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rowing" of portions of plaintiffs copyrightable program.141 In the other 
case, the court found that copyright laws preempted the state law of 
misappropriation with regard to input formats that the copyright laws 
addressed but did not protect. 142 The court reasoned that although rec• 
ognizing the misappropriation doctrine would further the federal policy 
of protecting creativity, this consideration was insufficient to validate 
the state law. The court viewed recognizing the misappropriation doc· 
trine as shifting the balance too far away from society's interest in ad· 
vancing knowledge. 
Although there may not be much room for applying the tort of mis· 
appropriation, state laws governing unfair competition and passing off 
may apply to copying or misappropriation when combined with preda· 
tory or other independently wrongful acts. 148 Not all courts apply the 
preemption doctrine broadly in cases involving copyright law. Thus, for 
example, authority exists for the proposition that if federal copyright 
law does not cover the subject matter, courts should consider the state 
misappropriation claim.144 Similarly, another court held that since 
141 Videotronics, 564 F. Supp. at 1471; see also Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 
639 F. Supp. 816 (W.D. Mo. 1986). 
141 Synercom Technology, Inc. v. University Computing Co., 474 F. Supp. 37 (N.D. 
Tex. 1979); see supra text accompanying note 74. For cases agreeing with Synercom 
that section 301 of the Copyright Act has a broad preemptive effect as to misappropria-
tion law, see Mitchell v. Penton/Indus. Publishing Co., 486 F. Supp. 22 (N.D. Ohio 
1979); Orth-O-Vision, Inc. v. Home Box Office, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 672, 683-84 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979). 
One commentator concludes that too few cases exist to draw any conclusions regard-
ing the Copyright Act's preemptive effect. 2 GALLMAN, supra note 85, § 15.08 at 24. 
"
8 See, e.g., Gemveto Jewelry Co. v. Jeff Cooper, Inc., 613 F. Supp. 1052, 1064 
(S.D.N.Y. 1985); see also, e.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. T-Shirt Gallery, Ltd., 
634 F. Supp. 1468, 1475 (S.D.N.Y. 1986): 
[A) state law cause of action is preempted only if the state law creates 
rights that are "equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general 
scope of copyright." A state right is equivalent to the copyright if the state 
right "is infringed by the mere act(s) of reproduction, performance, distri-
bution or display." On the other hand, if the state law violation requires 
an extra qualitative element beyond those acts, preemption will not apply 
(citations omitted). 
The decision stated that categorizing the misappropriation as unfair or immoral is not 
insufficient. Id. at 1476. 
1
" See, e.g., Financial Information, Inc. v. Moody's Investor Serv., Inc., 751 F.2d 
501, 510 (2d Cir. 1984) (misappropriation and copyright infringement claim of factual 
data compilation regarding publicly traded bonds; "FII has alleged in essence that 
Moody's unlawfully misappropriated its copyrighted material. If FII does prevail on its 
federal claim, the New York state claim will be preempted; if it does not prevail, the 
state claim will have to be considered"); Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet Management 
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copyright laws do not protect ideas, they do not preempt state law bar-
ring the misappropriation of ideas. 1411 When placing this narrow view 
of preemption in the context of computer software, it is at least argua-
ble that since ideas are not subject to copyright protection, processes 
such as programming techniques and subroutines may be subject to 
misappropriation claims.148 However, many courts have adopted the 
broader subject matter test for preemption, which views the issue as 
whether the work as a whole is in a form susceptible to copyright. 147 
Under this view, ideas contained in an original ~ork cannot be the 
subject of a misappropriation claim absent a showing of independent 
wrongdoing. 
"Passing off' laws are analogous to trademark law in that they give 
a product's producer or distributor protection against a competitor's 
passing off the product as her own. 148 Passing off laws granting such 
protection generally speak of preventing a confusion of source or origin 
of the product in question. 149 The law of unfair competition thus pro-
tects a software distributor against unfair marketing practices, but does 
not give any additional protection to the software's intellectual property 
content. In contrast, the law of trade secrets can provide significant pro-
tection. Trade secret protection appears feasible even in the context of 
mass marketed software. However, since trade secret law hinges on the 
Sys., Inc., 591 F. Supp. 726, 739 (N.D. Ill. 1983). 
m See, e.g., Eltra Corp. v. Ringer, 579 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1978) (discussing the 
copyrightability of a work of art); Leonard Storch Enters., Inc. v. Mergenthaler Lino-
type Co., 202 U.S.P.Q. 623 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). 
148 One court distinguished between whether the object of the misappropriation 
claim is subject to or excluded from copyright protection. Rand McNally & Co. v. Fleet 
Management Sys., Inc., 591 F. Supp. 726, 739 (N.D. Ill. 1983). Under this subject 
matter preemption test, misappropriation of ideas can be actionable. But see Universal 
City Studios, Inc. v. T-Shirt Gallery, Ltd., 634 F. Supp. 1468, 1475-76 (S.D.N.Y. 
1986). 
141 Ehat v. Tanner, 780 F.2d 876, 878 (10th Cir. 1985) ("[l)iterary works, including 
compilations and derivative works, are within the subject matter of copyright if they are 
original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression. This is so 
notwithstanding the material could not be copyrighted ... ") (citations omitted). 
148 Unfair competition law concerning passing off is designed to protect someone 
who has developed and marketed a product or service against someone else reaping 
from the seeds sown by the first. This is an extension of the proposition that one cannot 
sell another's products claiming them as her own. E.g., Elgin Nat'I Watch Co. v. Illi-
nois Watch Case Co., 179 U.S. 665 (1901); White Studio v. Dreyfoos, 221 N.Y. 46, 
116 N.E. 796 (1917). See generally 1 GALLMAN, supra note 85, at §§ 2.01-2.02. 
'" This is similar to trademark and unfair competition law protection. See, e.g., 
Estate of Pressley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1373 (D.N.J. 1981); Fotomat Corp. 
v. Photo Drive-Thru, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 693, 709 (D.N.J. 1977). 
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proprietor's efforts to maintain secrecy and to police violations of se-
crecy, the contractual provisions accompanying software dissemination 
can become crucial in determining both the existence and the scope of 
the trade secret protection. 
II. UTILIZING THE LAW OF CONTRACTS 
A. Overview of the Law Relating to Computer Contracts and 
Licensing 
As the foregoing discussion reveals, copyright laws, even when sup-
plemented with trade secrets laws, have not yet caught up with technol-
ogy in terms of defining the scope of protection for the intellectual 
property content of computer software. The courts, and perhaps Con-
gress, should assess the various competing interests and develop a better 
defined and hence more predictable set of rules governing the scope of 
software protection. Independent of such law reform action, contract 
law may help private parties deal with the issues. 
Various drafting techniques, some of which software merchants have 
used, can clarify the issues and fill some of the gaps left open by copy-
right law. The major issues that contractual provisions can address in-
clude: (1) defining the limits of permissible copying by the rightful 
owner of a copy of the program,1110 (2) protecting the program's struc-
ture, including functional subroutines whose copyrightability may be 
questionable,1111 and (3) protecting the screen images and input routines 
as well as the underlying source code.1112 Before addressing these issues 
directly, it is important to briefly examine the developing law relating 
to the treatment of computer software contracts and licenses in general. 
Software developers can employ licensing arrangements, among other 
things, to define and/or limit the user's right to copy and/or modify the 
computer software covered by the license. This is so because the use of 
a license avoids applying the "first sale" doctrine. 1113 The use of a li-
cense also permits altering the right of the rightful owner of a copy of a 
copyrighted work to transfer it through rental or resale. 1114 
A number of issues can arise under a license arrangement limiting 
160 See infra text accompanying notes 193-94. 
m See supra text accompanying notes 101-11. 
m See supra text accompanying notes 81-87, 95-100; cf. Synercom Technology, Inc. 
v. University Computing Co., 474 F. Supp. 37, 42 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (protecting input 
routines under state misappropriation law preempted by federal copyright law). 
168 See supra text accompanying notes 23-25. 
154 See 3M. NIMMER, supra note 25, at§ 10.01-.10; Brooks, supra note 27, at 17; 
Sherman, supra note 27, at 543-45. 
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the rights that would accompany an outright sale. These issues include 
the contract doctrine of unconscionability1H and preemption by the 
Copyright Act. 1118 Specifically, because of the transactions' subject mat-
ter, undue restrictions on the use of software arguably offend the policy 
of the copyright laws, rendering the restrictions unenforceable as con-
trary to public policy. 
B. Enforceability of Restrictive License Agreements 
The distribution chain for copyrighted works frequently involves nu-
merous parties, and contractual arrangements generally govern .their re-
spective roles. For example, publishing contracts may involve transfer-
ring the copyright from the author to the publisher. Alternatively, the 
author may give the publisher a license to distribute the copyrighted 
work. Distributors have used licensing agreements not only to define 
the scope of the intellectual property protections in disseminating com-
puter software, but also to define the law applicable to contact between 
the software's supplier and the end user. 
One of the many questions surrounding contracting for computer 
software involves determining what law governs. In every state except 
Louisiana, Article 2 of the U.C.C. governs transactions involving the 
sale of goods. 1117 Whether the sale of computer software is a sale of 
goods subject to Article 2 is unclear. 1118 The courts generally have found 
that computer programming contracts calling for substantial amounts of 
service, such as contracts to develop special applications programs, are 
100 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS§ 208; U.C.C. § 2-302 (1977). See 
generally Ellinghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969); Leff, 
Unconscionability and the Code - The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 
485 (1967); Murray, Unconscionability, Unconscionability, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 
(1969); Schwartz, A Reexamination of Nonsubstantive Unconscionability, 63 VA. L. 
REV. 1053 (1977); Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Problems, 117 U. PA. L. 
REV. 931 (1969); Speidel, Unconscionability, Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. 
PITT. L. REV. 359 (1970). But see Note, The Protection of Computer Software 
Through Shrink-Wrap License Agreements, 42 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1347, 1378 
(1985) [hereafter, Note, License Agreements) (suggesting that unconscionability should 
not be a problem). 
168 17 U.S.C. § 301 (1982) provides that the Act has a preemptive effect as to pro-
tecting copyrightable material. See Einhorn, supra note 25, at 520. For a more general 
discussion of preemption, see supra notes 139-40. 
167 1, lA Uniform Laws Ann. (1968 & Supp. 1986). 
168 See generally Note, Computer Software as a Good Under the Uniform Commer-
cial Code: Taking a Byte out of the Intangibility Myth, 65 B.U.L. REV. 129 (1985) 
[hereafter Note, Taking a Byte); Note, Computer Programs as Goods Under the 
U.C.C., 77 MICH. L. REV. 1149 (1979). 
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not subject to the Code. 1&9 
When the transaction takes the form of an outright sale of the pro-
gram (perhaps with incidental services), the better view is that the 
U.C.C.'s provisions dealing with goods should apply.160 Software un-
questionably possesses several unique aspects, including the issue of 
whether its intangible nature precludes classifying it as "goods" under 
Article 2. However, the U.C.C.'s applicability is not necessarily tied to 
the question of whether software is tangible, since courts can adopt the 
U.C.C. by analogy. Since the Code provides a more predictable set of 
rules than contract law generally, it presents a sound basis for resolving 
software disputes. Thus, because contracts dealing with transfers of 
computer software at least closely resemble the sale of goods, courts 
should apply Article 2's provisions as a matter of convenience. The 
Code was designed to deal with commercial transactions of the type 
involved in software distribution. 161 One writer suggests, for example, 
that the purchaser's perception should have a major role in determining 
how to characterize a software transaction for purposes of the 
U.C.C.162 
Determining that the U.C.C.'s provisions apply to transactions in-
volving software does not end the inquiry. The next question is 
whether the transaction takes the form of a sale. If not, many of the 
U.C.C.'s most important provisions would not apply. Accordingly, by 
framing the transaction as a license rather than a sale, a software dis-
tributor can opt out of many of the U.C.C.'s provisions. 
Software distributors' major concern over the U.C.C.'s applicability 
109 See, e.g., Computer Servicecenters, Inc. v. Beacon Mfg. Co., 328 F. Supp. 653 
(D.S.C. 1970), aff d, 443 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1971). 
180 See, e.g., RRX Indus., Inc. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1985); 
Burroughs Corp. v. Joseph Uram Jewelers, Inc., 305 So. 2d 215 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1974); W.R. Weaver Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 580 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979); 
Note, Taking a Byte, supra note 158; cf Hartford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Seibels, Bruce & 
Co., 579 F. Supp. 135 (D. Md. 1985) (whether software constituted goods was ques-
tion of fact for jury); Carl Beasley Ford, Inc. v. Burroughs Corp., 361 F. Supp. 325, 
(E.D. Pa. 1973), affd mem., 493 F.2d 1400 (3d Cir. 1974) (sale of hardware rather 
than software); National Surety Corp. v. Allied Sys., Inc., 418 So.2d 847 (Ala. 1982) 
(tort of conversion applies since computer software is a good). 
181 See Holmes, Application of Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code to 
Computer Software Acquisitions, RUT. CoMP. & TECH. L.J. 1, 15 (1982); Report, 
Software as Goods Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 40 REP. 754 (1985) (recom-
mendation of Bar Association of New York City); Note, Taking a Byte, supra note 
158. 
189 Chandler, Computer Transactions: Potential Liability of Computer Users and 
Vendors, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 405, 421 (1977). 
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likely involves the warranty provisions applying to the sale of goods. 168 
The U.C.C.'s warranty provisions do not apply to leases or other non-
sale transactions. 16" According I y, if a court recognizes a license agree-
ment as not involving a sale, the U.C.C.'s provisions would not apply 
even if the court characterized software as a good.1611 However, once 
again, even if the U.C.C.'s warranty provisions do not directly apply to 
a license transaction, a court may still wish to apply them by analogy 
or, alternatively, simply recognize a comparable common law war-
ranty .166 It is important to keep in mind that even if a court character-
izes a software license as a sale for purposes of the U.C.C., the transac-
tion may not necessarily constitute a sale under the Copyright Act's 
first sale doctrine. 167 
When dealing with mass marketed licensing arrangements, not only 
do the unconscionability issues become more pressing, 168 but serious 
questions may arise relating to contract formation. Specifically, can the 
188 E.g., id.; Comment, Liability for Defects in Computer Software, 53 J. URBAN L. 
279 (1975). For discussion of the Code and warranties.generally, see J. WHITE & C. 
SUMMERS, HORNBOOK ON THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE§§ 9-10 - 9-13 (1980). 
In addition to the Code's warranty provisions, at the federal level the Magnuson-Moss 
Act limits the ability to disclaim implied warranties. 15 U.S.C. § 2308 (1982). 
HM E.g., K-B Trucking Co. v. Riss Int'! Corp., 763 F.2d 1148, 1164 (10th Cir. 
1985); Royal Typewriter Co. v. Xerographic Supplies, 719 F.2d 1092, 1100 (11th Cir. 
1983); Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., 353 A.2d 581, 584 (Del. 1976); All-States 
Leasing Co. v. OCHS, 42 Or. App. 319, 334-36, 600 P.2d 899, 909 (1979); see infra 
note 166. 
185 One writer suggests treating software licenses as sales under the Code. Note, 
License Agreements, supra note 155, at 1370; Note, "Box-Top" License Agreements, 
supra note 27, at 881; see also Comment, Enforceability of Box-Top Licenses: A Pro-
posal to End the Dilemma, 2 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 171 
(1986). 
188 Redfern Meats, Inc. v. Hertz Corp., 134 Ga. App. 381, 393, 215 S.E.2d 10, 18-
19 (1975); Glenn Dick Equip. Co. v. Galey Constr. Co., 97 Idaho 216, 222-23, 225, 
541 P.2d 1184, 1190-91, 1193 (1975); All States Leasing Co. v. Bass, 96 Idaho 873, 
877-81, 538 P.2d 1177, 1181-85 (1975); Michigan Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. v. Freuhauf 
Corp., 63 Mich. App. 109,118,234 N.W.2d 424, 428 (1975); Nevada Nat'! Bank v. 
Huff, 94 Nev. 506, 512, 582 P.2d 364, 369 (1978). 
187 See 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (1982); supra note 19; infra note 177. In addition to the 
preemption doctrine, such statutes might run afoul of the Commerce Clause. Specifi-
cally, one could argue that state-to-state variations in the validity of restrictive licensing 
arrangements pose an undue burden on interstate commerce, especially in light of the 
interest in uniformity prompted by the Copyright Act. Cf Edgar v.'MITE Corp., 457 
U.S. 624 (1982) (invalidating state tender offer statutes under the commerce clause in 
light of national uniformity interests and the policy of the Securities Exchange Act of 
1934). 
188 See, e.g., Speidel, supra note 155. 
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software distributor bind a purchaser to the license's terms by virtue of 
the purchaser's act of opening the software package? Even assuming 
that the distributor gives adequate notice of the license, the licensee 
could challenge the agreement as an adhesion contract.169 The inability 
to negotiate is one benchmark of an unenforceable adhesion contract,170 
and since software is generally distributed by retailers not possessing 
authority to change the terms of a licensing arrangement, the doctrine 
may be applicable. 
State legislatures have reacted to the use of shrink wrap or box top 
licenses by passing legislation addressing both contract formation and 
unconscionability. Specifically, Louisiana and Illinois have enacted stat-
utes171 validating shrink wrap licenses, while the California legislature 
has refused to follow suit. 172 Under the Louisiana statute, which served 
as the model for the others, a shrink wrap license is valid provided the 
package gives clear notice. Given appropriately clear notice on the 
package,173 the license may: (1) provide that ownership of the software 
remains with the licensor, (2) prohibit or limit the copying of the pro-
gram, (3) prohibit or limit user modification of the software, (4) pro-
hibit or limit transfer of the licensee's rights,174 and (5) provide for the 
189 E.g., Henrioulle v. Marin Ventures, Inc., 20 Cal.3d 512, 573 P.2d 465, 143 Cal. 
Rptr. 247 (1978) (invalidating exculpatory clause in residential lease); Klar v. H&M 
Parcel Room, Inc., 270 A.D. 538, 61 N.Y.S.2d 285, affd mem., 296 N.Y. 1044, 73 
N.E.2d 912 (1947) (disclaimer on parcel claim check held invalid because inadequate 
notice of contract's special nature). But see O'Callaghan v. Waller & Beckwith Realty 
Co., 15 Ill. 2d 436, 155 N.E.2d 545 (1958) (upholding exculpatory clause in apartment 
rental agreement). See generally Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion - Some Thoughts 
About Freedom of Contract, 43 CoLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943); Oldfather, Toward a 
Usable Method of judicial Review of the Adhesion Contractor's Lawmaking, 16 U. 
KAN. L. REV. 303 (1968). 
170 E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960) 
(invalidating warranty disclaimer). 
171 ILL. STAT. ch.§ 29 802 (1986 Supp.); LA. REV. STATS. ANN. tit. 51 §§ 1961-66 
(West Supp. 1986). Significantly, Louisiana is the only state not to have enacted article 
2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
172 See Swartz, The "Shrink Wrap" Software License: Protection or Rip-off?, CoM-
MOOORE MICROCOMPUTERS 96, 97 Uanuary, February 1986). Similar legislation is or 
has been under consideration in Arizona, California, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois and 
Washington. Id. 
178 The notice must prominently appear on the package in all capital letters, clearly 
explaining the consequences of acceptance of the terms by opening the package. The 
notice must also explain that the user may return the unopened package and receive a 
refund. LA. REV. STATS. ANN. tit. 51 § 1963 (West Supp. 1986). 
174 The transfer restrictions cannot, however, extend to a transfer "in connection 
with the sale or transfer by operation of law of all or substantially all of the operating 
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license's automatic termination upon breach by the licensee of any of its 
provisions. 176 Under such a statute the software's licensor can clearly 
limit the software's use more severely than under copyright law, unless 
a court finds that such an application of the statute is preempted by 
copyright law.176 
The use of mass marketed shrink wrap licenses adds additional is-
sues to the enforceability of restrictive software licenses. However, the 
copyright related issues seemingly do not depend upon whether the re-
strictions are contained in bargained-for agreements, or are part of a 
shrink wrap license. 
C. Contractual Limitations on Use and Dissemination: The 
Preemptive Effect of Federal Copyright Law and Public Policy 
Considerations 
As noted earlier, the first sale doctrine gives the rightful owner of a 
copy the right to make archival copies, and also to transfer the right-
fully owned copy through sale, lease or otherwise.177 However, the 
copyright owner can contractually restrict the dissemination of copy-
righted material. Thus, for example, distribution licenses defining the 
rights among and between the various parties in the distribution chain 
are quite common. The copyright laws do not preempt ordinary licens-
ing arrangements or other contractual restrictions. 178 The question 
arises, however, whether severe contractual restrictions conflict with the 
careful balance drawn by the copyright laws between the copyright 
owner's property rights and the public's right to information.179 In an 
assets of a licensee's business." Id. at § 1964(4). 
170 Id. at§ 1964(5). 
178 See Note, "Box-Top" License Agreements, supra note 27, at 911. 
m 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(3), 109(a) (1982). 
178 There is legislative history to the effect that end-user limitations are permissible. 
See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1, 79 (1976) ("This does not mean 
that the conditions of the future disposition of copies ... imposed by a contract between 
buyer and seller, would be unenforceable between the parties as a breach of contract, 
but it does mean that they cannot be enforced by an action for infringement of copy-
right"). Accord Fantastic Fakes, Inc. v. Pickwick Int'l, Inc., 661 F.2d 479, 483 (5th 
Cir. 1981) ("while the context of copyright law in which the agreement exists cannot 
be overlooked, application of Georgia rules to determine parties' contractual intent is 
not preempted"); cf Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979) (patent 
law does not preempt contractual royalty during pendency of patent application). 
178 See Fantastic Fakes, 661 F.2d at 483 ("It is possible to hypothesize situations 
where application of particular state rules of construction would so alter rights granted 
by the copyright statutes as to so invade the scope of copyright law or violate its 
policies"). 
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analogous situation, a court has invalidated a contractµal license for a 
duration longer than the life of the underlying patent.180 
The Supreme Court has held that attempting to extend the monopoly 
granted by a patent beyond its seventeen year duration is invalid. Thus, 
a license/royalty agreement requiring payment beyond the patent's life 
is unenforceable. 181 Such an agreement is contrary to the policy and 
purpose of federal patent law. 182 In contrast, when multiple patents are 
involved and some have not yet expired, courts will enforce a license 
agreement and royalty arrangement extending beyond the !if e of the 
expired patents.188 The rule limiting the duration of a royalty agree-
ment does not apply when the patent is a use license for unpatented 
works, 18' or when a patent is applied for but never issued. 1811 Thus, the 
Court upheld a use license in which the patent was never issued, not-
withstanding the claim that there was no trade secret since the prod-
uct's design was obvious. 188 The Court pointed out that the licensee 
was able to preempt the market by making the product while the pat-
ent application was pending. Thus, the court required royalty pay-
ments even though the patent was never issued. 187 Courts have used the 
same rationale to uphold royalty payments far beyond the time period 
during which a nonpatented process is a trade secret. 188 
180 Boggild v. Kenner Prods., 776 F.2d 1315 (6th Cir. 1985). Courts will uphold a 
license exceeding the patent period only when a patent was never issued. Id. at 1319 
(citing Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979)). 
181 Brulotte v. Thys Co., 379 U.S. 29 (1964); see also, e.g., Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. 
Mestre, 701 F.2d 1365 (11th Cir. 1985); Pipkin v. FMC Corp., 427 F.2d 353 (5th 
Cir. 1970); Ar-Tik Sys., Inc. v. Dairy Queen, Inc., 302 F.2d 496 (3d Cir. 1962). 
181 Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 32; Scott Paper Co. v. Marcalus Co., 326 U.S. 249, 256 
(1945); Horwitt v. Movado Watch Agency, Inc., 62 F.R.D. 5, 7 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
188 See Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55 (7th Cir. 
1970); McCullough Tool Co. v. Well Surveys, Inc., 343 F.2d 381 (10th Cir. 1965). 
1a. Brulotte, 379 U.S. at 32. 
m Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979). 
19e Id. 
187 Id. The case involved a useful but obvious key chain design. 
188 See, e.g., Warner-Lambert Pharmaceutical Co. v. John J. Reynolds, Inc., 178 F. 
Supp. 655 (S.D.N.Y. 1959), affd per curiam, 280 F.2d 197 (2d Cir. 1960), noted in 
74 HARV. L. REV. 409 (1960). In Warner, the court upheld a royalty agreement from 
the 1881 transfer of Listerine's trademark and formula, even though the formula had 
become public knowledge. The royalty agreement had no specified duration, and the 
court held that it was effective so long as Listerine is marketed. 
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1. Some General Principles 
The foregoing patent and trade secret cases provide some general 
principles. First, if the owner of a process elects patent law protection, 
she cannot extend that protection beyond the scope and duration of the 
limited statutory monopoly. 189 Extending this rationale to the limited 
monopoly granted under the copyright laws seems reasonable.190 
The question thus becomes the extent to which someone who decides 
to rely on copyright law protection rather than trade secret law can, 
through a license or other contractual agreement, provide protection for 
the copyrighted work greater than that granted under the Copyright 
Act. The cases limiting patent licensing agreements along with first sale 
doctrine rights provide an argument that restrictive terms of license 
agreements to end users of software may not be enforceable. The types 
of provisions that are subject to attack include restricting the software's 
transfer, limiting the software's use to a single machine and thus pur-
porting to preclude the licensee from transporting the program disk 
from one machine to another; and prohibiting the making of back-up or 
archival copies. The nonenforceability of such restrictive agreements 
may gain some support from a recent decision upholding contractual 
restrictions on copying and redistribution but conditioning the ruling on 
finding a valid copyright. 191 Although the court did not explain the ba-
sis for this condition, an arguable rationale is that a licensing agree-
ment cannot create greater rights than a valid copyright would provide. 
189 With regard to patent protection scope, a line of cases holds that attempts to 
overextend patent protection can violate the federal antitrust laws. See, e.g., Digityne 
Corp. v. Data Gen. Corp., 734 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding illegal tying ar-
rangement and presuming existence of market power from existence of copyright); 
Note, Tying Arrangements and the Computer Industry: Digityne Corp. v. Data Gen. 
Corp., 1985 DUKE L.J. 1027. See generally P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST 
LAW Ch. 7-7B (1978); W. BOWMAN, PATENT AND ANTITRUST LAW (1973); Kaplow, 
The Patent-Antitrust Intersections: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1815 (1984); 
McGrath, Patent Licensing Today: A Fresh Look at Antitrust Principles in a Chang-
ing Economic Environment, 82 PAT. & T.M. REV. 355 (1984). 
Similar problems can arise in the copyright law context. See, e.g., Sommer, Patent 
License Restrictions, 59 CONN. B.J. 235 (1985); Note, CBS v. ASCAP: Blanket Li-
censing and the Unresolved Conflict Between Copyright and Antitrust Law, 13 CONN. 
L. REV. 465 (1981); Note, Blanket Licensing: The Clash Between Copyright Protection 
and the Sherman Act, 55 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 729 (1980). 
190 See April Prods. v. G. Schirmer, Inc., 308 N.Y. 366, 126 N.E.2d 283 (1955) 
(indicating that as a general proposition there is no obligation to pay royalties pursuant 
to a copyright license after the expiration of the underlying copyright). 
191 S&H Computer Sys., Inc. v. SAS Inst., Inc., 568 F. Supp. 416, 420-21 (M.D. 
Tenn. 1983). 
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Accordingly, a court could view the more restrictive licenses as contrary 
to the policy of the copyright laws and th1.1s unenforceable. 192 
Another basis for refusing to enforce restrictive terms in software li-
censing agreements is treating the purported license as a sale for pur-
poses of the first sale doctrine.193 Especially when the copyright owner 
gives the license to the end user rather than to a distributor or other 
middle person, the agreement between the copyright owner and the end 
user resembles a sale. This might be ref erred to as a "de facto" sale 
doctrine. 
However, when the license in question is a true license rather than a 
sale disguised to avoid limitations of the copyright laws, courts would 
not invoke the first sale doctrine. Courts generally hold that transfer-
ring title triggers the first sale doctrine. 194 On the other hand, the ab-
sence of a formal transfer of title need not preclude applying the doc-
trine when the transaction bears all of the other benchmarks of a sale. 
Determining whether a sale took place should not depend upon 
whether title transferred. Rather, it should depend on whether the 
transaction is in substance a sale. 
Just as books, phono records, and audio and video tapes are gener-
ally transferred to the end user in a sale - as opposed to a licensing 
transaction - transferring software to the end user might create a pre-
sumption in favor of a sale. The transferor would then have the burden 
of showing that in substance the transaction is something other than a 
sale. Such a "true license" exists, for example, with a site license when 
the licensee is paying for the right to make copies and use the software 
on a large number of machines. 1911 Similarly, when the software's trans-
fer is combined with a large service or maintenance component, the 
181 The void as against public policy approach is a variation on the potential pre-
emption argument discussed supra in text accompanying notes 138-46. 
193 Many commentators have suggested a similar approach regarding whether a li-
cense is a sale under the Uniform Commercial Code. See supra note 161. See generally 
6A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS§ 1375 (1962). 
1114 See, e.g., United States v. Powell, 701 F.2d 70, 72-73 (8th Cir. 1983); American 
Int'! Pictures, Inc. v. Foreman, 576 F.2d 661 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Drebin, 
557 F.2d 1316, 1330 (9th Cir. 1977); Harrison v. Maynard, Merrill & Co., 61 F. 689 
(2d Cir. 1894); Burke & Van Heusen, Inc. v. Arrow Drug Co., 233 F. Supp. 881, 883 
(E.D. Pa. 1964); United States v. Wells, 176 F. Supp. 630, 634 (S.D. Tex. 1959); 2 
M. NIMMER, supra note 25, at § 8. 12(B][ 1 ]. 
m Cf United States v. Wise, 550 F.2d 1180, 1190 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 
929 (1977) (bona fide license does not trigger first sale doctrine); Hampton v. Para-
mount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 103 (9th Cir. 1960) (contract that expressly "li-
censed" right to make reproductions not construed as assignment of rights sufficient to 
constitute sale). 
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transaction is more properly viewed as a license than an outright sale. 
Beyond such bona fide licensing arrangements, courts should fashion 
a rule that would apply the first sale doctrine to a transaction that is in 
substance a sale, although cast in terms of a licensing agreement. The 
suggested de facto sale approach seems especially appropriate to a mass 
marketed license when the user may well believe that a sale is taking 
place. Even aside from the mass marketing context, the copyright law 
policies favoring a limitation on the copyright monopoly's scope war-
rant applying the first sale doctrine flexibly. The law's prohibitions 
against direct copying and creating infringing derivative works give 
copyright owners a sufficient economic stake in their work without un-
duly restricting purchaser use of the program. 
Limiting the distributor's ability to restrict the rights that would be 
granted under the first sale doctrine can be accomplished in one of two 
ways. The courts could reach such a result either by relying upon a 
preemption rationale or by voiding the restrictions as contrary to public 
policy. A contractual provision restrictive enough to upset the copyright 
laws' balance between the creator's and the public's rights may warrant 
a preemption approach. 
The second approach to limiting the distributor's ability to restrict 
first sale rights, applying public policy analysis, gives the courts wider 
discretion in striking down provisions than the more narrowly defined 
preemption approach. The preemption approach is mandatory rather 
than discretionary. If a federal statute preempts a state statute or a 
contractual provision, the state statute or contractual provision is per se 
invalid. In contrast, in deciding whether a contractual provision violates 
public policy, the courts are not so much bound by doctrinal limitations 
as they are asked to look to all available evidence of the applicable 
policy.He 
In deciding whether a contractual provision is unenforceable as con-
trary to public policy, a number of considerations come into play, in-
cluding legislation defining the policy. 197 Copyright laws' balancing can 
be viewed as such policy-defining legislation. In other situations, courts 
have ruled contracts that appear valid under state law void as against 
the public policy of a federal statute.188 However, to adopt the public 
196 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 178 (1981); Anaconda 
Federal Credit Union #4401 v. West, 157 Mont. 175,178,483 P.2d 909,911 (1971). 
See generally 6A A. CORBIN, supra note 193, at § 1375; Gelhorn, Contracts and 
Public Policy, 35 CoLUM. L. REV. 679 (1935). 
197 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 179(a) (1981). 
188 For example, an agreement by an issuer of securities to indemnify an under-
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policy approach, a court would have to find the state law policy consis-
tent with the federal policy suggested above. Evidence of a contrary 
state policy would remove the court's discretion to void such provisions 
(short of invoking the preemption doctrine). Thus, for example, when a 
state adopts legislation attempting to validate mass marketed licenses, 199 
a court cannot rely on a public policy argument to void such licenses. 
The court would have to enforce the license unless it found that the 
Copyright Act preempted both the contract and the legislation. 
In addition to a preemption attack on the shrink wrap statutes, a 
court might entertain the argument that since software mass marketing 
primarily involves interstate commerce, the absence of uniformity ren-
ders the legislation invalid as an undue interference with interstate 
commerce. The Supreme Court recently used this approach in striking 
down state tender off er statutes that were more restrictive than the fed-
eral securities laws.200 Arguably, potential state-to-state shrink wrap 
license variations render state legislation in this area invalid as an un-
due burden on commerce. 
The courts thus have alternative means for limiting the scope of 
broadly drafted contractual restrictions on the use and dissemination of 
copyrighted computer programs. Given this potential, the question be-
comes whether courts should utilize it. The following section recom-
mends that under the aegis of a de facto sale approach, the courts can 
enforce reasonable contractual limitations without impinging on the 
balances drawn by the Copyright Act. 
D. The Enforceability of Restrictive Contractual Provisions - A 
Suggested Approach 
There are two varieties of contractual restrictions on the use and dis-
semination of computer programs. The first restriction involves limita-
tions on making archival copies or reselling the program to third par-
ties. 201 Licenses may embody these restrictions to avoid the first sale 
writer for liabilities arising under the federal securities laws has been held void as 
against public policy. Globus v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 418 F.2d 1276 (2d Cir. 
1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 913 (1970). The reasoning of the Globus case is that 
since the federal securities laws set out a high standard of care for underwriters, an 
indemnification agreement is likely to undercut that standard by limiting the under-
writers' stake. See generally T. HAZEN, HoRNBOOK ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES 
REGULATION § 7.9 (1985). 
199 See supra notes 171-73. 
aoo Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). See generally T. HAZEN, supra 
note 198, at § 11.22; see also supra note 167 and accompanying text. 
101 Cf 17 U.S.C. § t 09 (1982). 
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doctrine's impact. As suggested above, when such a license is one in 
form only, the courts should adopt a de facto sale doctrine to prevent 
undercutting the copyright laws' careful balance between the creator's 
rights and the interest in disseminating knowledge.202 When, however, 
such licenses are more than a disguised sale, courts should enforce re-
strictive agreements. 
Similarly, courts should void any attempt through a mass-marketed 
license or other disguised sale to unduly restrict the licensee's use of the 
program's ideas or other public domain aspects of the program. Such 
attempts violate the policy of the federal copyright laws. However, 
when such limitations on the use of ideas or programming techniques 
and routines arise in the context of a special relationship (such as with 
joint venturers or the employer and the employee who helps develop the 
program), courts should enforce restrictions on the use of ideas and 
other public domain processes. The enforcement should operate under 
the law of trade secrets, misappropriation, or through the use of well-
drafted contractual restrictions. 
Absent some limit on software distributors' ability to impinge first 
sale doctrine rights, a distribution network would exist that would not 
be tolerated for copyrighted works in other mediums - at least not 
without enabling legislation. Consider, for example, a decision by the 
publishing industry to institute a new system of distribution based on 
licensing rather than outright sales. The licensee would have a right to 
personal use and no more. The licensee could read the book or maga-
zine, but would have no right to transfer it to anyone else. Under such 
a plan, libraries would go out of business unless they negotiated a spe-
cial license, including, for example, royalty arrangements based on the 
number of times each book were borrowed.203 Such a distribution 
method would significantly decrease circulation, and thus would seri-
ously impede the dissemination of information. Would our legal system 
tolerate such a radical change? I submit that courts would find some 
method, such as the de facto sale approach or preemption, to hold the 
hypothetical licensing system contrary to public policy and perhaps pre-
empted by the first sale doctrine. 
101 The courts have considered a de facto sale approach in other contexts. For exam-
ple, courts should give lessees an opportunity to show that a lease with an option to 
purchase was in fact a credit sale subject to the federal Truth in Lending Act. Clark v. 
Rent-it Corp., 685 F.2d 245 (8th Cir. 1982). However, the Truth in Lending Act's 
legislative history suggested Congress had anticipated that such disguised sales might 
take place. Id. at 248, relying on Mourning v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 411 
U.S. 356, 365 (1973). 
108 Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1982). 
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In some areas the traditional sale approach to copyrighted works 
may not work as the general basis for distribution. Determining the 
inadequacy of the outright sale would have to be based on a finding 
that absent some variation, the creator of an artistic, literary, or audio-
visual work could not acquire fair compensation for the creativity be-
hind the copyrighted work. One such example is the distribution of 
copyrighted music and musical arrangements. In 1909 Congress re-
sponded to the differences between the published written word and mu-
sic by passing a compulsory licensing system for copyrighted musical 
compositions and arrangements.204 The Copyright Act retained this sui 
generis compulsory licensing system. 206 The Copyright Act also estab-
lished a compulsory licensing system for secondary cable transmissions 
of radio and television broadcasts, and for use of certain works in con-
nection with noncommercial broadcasting.206 However, no such explicit 
statutory authority exists for a distribution system based on licensing of 
computer software. 
In response to the Supreme Court's ruling that videotape recording 
for home use does not violate copyright law,207 legislators have pro-
posed royalty pools for copyright owners. Surcharges on the sale of 
blank video and audio tapes would fund the pools.208 As with compul-
sory licensing for music and secondary cable transmissions, congres-
sional approval is viewed as the appropriate route when the need is 
perceived for a distribution system other than traditional outright sale. 
Thus, if computer software's technology warrants a general distribu-
tion method other than outright sale - which is a doubtful proposition 
- federal legislation is the appropriate route for implementation. If 
software license agreements are desirable in lieu of mass market sales, 
the appropriate legislative body should have responsibility for creating 
this new form of consumer ownership. The appropriate legislature is 
1
°' Copyright Act of 1909 § l(e), 17 U.S.C. § l(e) (1976) (repealed). 
•
0
• 17 U.S.C. § 115 (1982); see also Rosen, A Common Law for the Ages of Intellec-
tual Property, 38 U. MIAMI L. REV. 769 (1984); Comment, Combatting Software 
Piracy: A Statutory Proposal to Strengthen Software Copyright, 34 DEPAUL L. REV. 
933 (1985). 
106 17 U.S.C. §§ 11 l(d), 118(b) (1982). The Act also established the Copyright 
Royalty Tribunal to deal with the Act's compulsory licensing arrangements. Id. at §§ 
801-10. 
107 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). See, e.g., 
Sinclair, Fair Use Old and New: The Betamax Case and Its Forebears, 33 BUFFALO 
L. REV. 269 (1984); Note, VCR Home Recording and Title 17: Does Congress Have 
the Answer to Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.?, 35 SYRACUSE L. 
REV. 793 (1984). 
108 S. 1739, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985); H.R. 2911, 99th Cong., 1st sess. (1985). 
1986] Computer Software Protection 155 
Congress, both because the Copyright Act is a federal statute, and be-
cause any legislation would have a pervasive impact on interstate com-
merce. It follows that courts should invalidate attempts to implement 
such a system without federal legislation as contrary to the balance 
struck by the copyright laws. In the absence of federal legislation, the 
courts should scrutinize carefully restrictive software licenses. 
Another reason for questioning the validity of overly restrictive 
software licenses is the prohibition against unreasonable restraints on 
alienation. The rule, which originated with real property but has also 
been applied to personal property,209 holds that direct restraints on 
alienation are generally invalid. Similarly, absent special justification, 
restraints on assigning contractual rights not involving personal services 
are generally ineffective. 210 In light of these age-old limitations, courts 
should regard skeptically software licenses restricting transferability, 
even aside from the copyright laws' special policies. The right to pass 
property to someone else normally accompanies the transfer of certain 
property rights. Similarly, when an owner markets software in a trans-
action that, other than its nomenclature as a license, bears all of the 
benchmarks of a sale, courts may render severe restrictions on use and 
transferability invalid. Copyright law defines the parameters of one va-
riety of intellectual property. The policy behind limitations on unrea-
sonable restraints on alienation applies to copyrighted works as a type 
of property. Further, the first sale doctrine is an express statement of 
certain transfer rights. 
Although the de facto sale doctrine would particularly impact prod-
ucts mass marketed under shrink wrap licenses, the doctrine may have 
other applications. Shrink wrap and box top licenses present special 
enforcement problems because arguably the licensee has not assented to 
the terms. Courts could find such licenses unconscionable,211 or could 
108 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, THE LA w OF FUTURE INTERESTS § 1161 (2d ed. 
1956); 2 F.H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 7.06 (2d ed. 
1971); Haskell, Contractual Devices to Keep Undesirables Out of the Neighborhood, 
54 CORNELL L. REV. 521, 527-33 (1969). 
llO 3 L. SIMES & A. SMITH, supra note 209, at § 1165; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§§ 317(2), 322 (1981). 
111 See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.D.C. 
1965) (consumer credit agreement may be unconscionable); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 
59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (holding consumer credit agree-
ment unconscionable); see also, e.g., A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. 
App. 3d 473, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114 (1982) (invalidating limitations on consequential 
damages); cf. Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d 80 (3d Cir. 1948) (refusing equi-
table relief under unconscionable contract). See generally S. DEUTSCH, UNFAIR CoN-
TRACTS (1977); Braucher, The Unconscionable Contract or Term, 31 U. PITT. L. 
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hold them to be adhesion contracts. 212 
However, even if adequate disclosure or legislation neutralizes such 
attacks, the question remains whether the de facto sale approach is 
mandated by copyright law or is a matter of policy. I find the latter 
alternative more suitable. When a transaction in all other respects re-
sembles a sale, and deprives the user of rights under the first sale doc-
trine or other copyright law provisions, courts should not enforce the 
restrictions absent some special basis for enforcing them. The licensor 
should thus bear the burden of justifying the license's restrictions. 
Under this suggested approach, courts may enforce many contractual 
restrictions going beyond the normal copyright protection. For example, 
consider a bona fide site license. Rather than sell a copy of the program 
for each user at a specific location, the user (usually a business or edu-
cational institution) may desire to pay a flat fee for unlimited use of the 
program by its employees (or students). In such a case a site license 
gives the user a discount that is unavailable with direct sales. Such a 
license would preserve the distributor's proprietary interest in the prod-
uct's intellectual content. Accordingly, under such an arrangement, lim-
iting the program's use to some number of users or machines, or 
prohibiting transfer of the site license, is consistent with the balance 
sought by copyright law. 
Restrictive agreements are also appropriate when a software distrib-
utor licenses a process as a trade secret. This occurs frequently, for 
example, when the software is custom tailored to the licensee's needs, 
or when the licensor provides other services in conjunction with the 
software license. 
Enforcement of trade secret rights depends on the existence of a pro-
tectable secret. Trade secret law will not protect something readily ap-
parent to the ordinary observer.213 Accordingly, a trade secret approach 
REV. 337 (1970); Ellinghaus, supra note 155; Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical 
Reappraisal, 18 J. L. & EcoN. 293 (1975); Leff, supra note 155; Murray, supra note 
155; Spanogle, supra note 155. 
112 See, e.g., Henningson v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 
(1960) (invalidating warranty disclaimer of liability for consequential losses); Klar v. 
H. & M. Parcel Room, Inc., 270 A.D. 538, 61 N.Y.S.2d 285, afj'd mem., 296 N.Y. 
1044, 73 N .E.2d 912 (1947) (invalidating limitation of liability on claim check); RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS§ 211 (1981); cf. O'Callaghan V. 
Waller & Beckwith Realty Co., 15 Ill. 2d 436, 155 N.E.2d 545 (1958) (refusing to 
deny enforcement to limitation of liability in residential lease agreement). See generally 
Kessler, supra note 169; Murray, The Standardized Agreement Phenomena in the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 735 (1982). 
218 See supra text accompanying notes 95-132. 
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applies only to bona fide situations, not subterfuges in the mass market. 
Thus, trade secret law would not protect screen images or input rou-
tines that are not copyrightable. However, if combined with a code en-
cryption and/or copy protection scheme, licensors may keep program-
ming techniques and algorithms secret from the ordinary user. Thus, 
licensors may protect secret processes or algorithms pursuant to con-
tractual arrangements with parties given special access to them. Simi-
larly, when some wrongdoing such as industrial espionage or theft 
takes place, the misappropriation tort21 ' may protect certain 
noncopyrightable aspects of computer software. The misappropriation 
doctrine is of little help absent independent wrongdoing or a special 
relationship between the parties, when use or disclosure of the informa-
tion constitutes a breach of confidentiality or fiduciary duty.2111 
CONCLUSION 
The legal theories protecting intellectual property have varying de-
grees of effectiveness when applied to computer software. Patent law is 
potentially the strongest 'protection, but appears unavailable since it is 
inapplicable to mathematical algorithms standing alone. Copyright law 
provides significant protection for programming code and screen images 
as expressions, but does not protect the ideas embodied therein. Trade 
secret law may protect ideas such as programming techniques, subrou-
tines, or algorithms when the creator does not publicly disclose them. 
Although the extent of preemption by the Copyright Act remains a se-
rious question, the tort of misappropriation may play a role in protect-
ing the software's intellectual property content. 
Additional contractual limitations can best implement the various 
available protections. However, the extent of potential contractual re-
strictions is limited, especially between the creator of the program and 
the end user. When a software creator or distributor attempts to use a 
license agreement as a guise to provide protections that would otherwise 
be unavailable under copyright law, courts should consider the federal 
u• See supra text accompanying notes 133-48. 
U& RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF RESTITUTION § 200, comment a (1937): 
A fiduciary is subject to a duty to the beneficiary not to use on his own 
account information confidentially given him by the beneficiary or ac-
quired by him during the course of or on account of the fiduciary relation 
or in violation of his duties as fiduciary, in competition with or to the 
injury of the beneficiary ... unless the information is a matter of general 
knowledge. 
See RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF AGENCY § 388, comment c (1958). 
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law's preemptive effect and the general public policy of maintaining the 
balance struck by Congress in the Copyright Act. 
Thus, in deciding whether the user should have first sale doctrine 
rights, courts should apply a de facto sale doctrine when the transaction 
bears the essential benchmarks of a sale. Further, courts should pre-
sume that a license agreement with an end-user is a sale, leaving the 
burden on the licensor to prove that instead it is a bona fide license. 
Under this Article's approach, the judiciary could maintain the appro-
priate balance between creators' rights to the fruits of their labors, and 
the public's interest in disclosure, information dissemination, and 
knowledge advancement. 
